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INTRODUCTION
I remember going on a field trip at school, where everyone was sup-
posed to pay five dollars. I had to bring in a five-dollar food stamp.
The other kids just laughed and laughed.
- Yale Law School student, February 2001
t The Author wishes to thank Anne Alstott for her thoughtful comments
throughout the development of this Essay, as well as many others who helped
refine the arguments presented here, most particularly Stacy Beck and Paul
Frick. The author also wishes to acknowledge the helpful editorial assistance
provided by Mona Peterson Rosow and the staff of the Minnesota Law Review.
The views expressed are solely those of the author and are not necessarily en-
dorsed by the Center on Budget Policy and Priorities.
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Policymakers seeking to reduce poverty through some kind
of public assistance for lower-income people face a number of
critical program design questions. In recent years, the issue
dominating public debate in the United States has been how to
avoid work disincentives. As a result, with the exception of the
elderly and the severely disabled, nearly everyone is now ex-
pected to work in order to receive many types of public assis-
tance. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), which transfers
cash through the tax code to lower-income people with wage
earnings, has become a greater source of federal dollars for
lower-income families than traditional welfare programs like
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or food
stamps.' Likewise, many people enrolled in traditional welfare
programs, such as the federal-state TANF program,2 state
General Assistance,3 and the federally funded food stamp pro-
gram, 4 now face substantial work requirements.
Amidst the frenzy over work requirements, little attention
has been paid to another, perhaps equally critical design ques-
tion-what form should public assistance take? Public assis-
tance today is a haphazard mix of cash transfers, vouchers,
electronic benefits, in-kind aid (meaning the direct provision of
specific goods or services, such as food or housing), and tax re-
bates for certain purchases. This grab bag of benefits is likely
to get even more complex in the post-welfare-reform world,
where vouchers, electronic benefits, and other non-cash aid are
increasingly being looked to as solutions for people who reach
federal time limits on TANF-funded cash assistance.5 Yet few
have questioned or examined the potential pitfalls of a move
toward non-cash transfers.6 Liberals tend to focus mainly on
getting something of value in the hands of lower-income people,
often with the openly paternalistic motive of addressing what
they perceive as peoples' needs. Conservatives claim their goal
1. See infra text accompanying notes 118-24.
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (Supp. V 1999).
3. See L. Jerome Gallagher, A Shrinking Portion of the Safety Net: Gen-
eral Assistance from 1989 to 1998, NEw FEDERALISM: ISSUES AND OPTIONS
FOR STATES, Sept. 1999, at 4, available at http'//newfederalism.urban.org/
pdf/anfLa36.pdf.
4. See 7 U.S.C. § 2029 (2000).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 115, 119.
6. But cf Janet Currie, Welfare and the Well-Being of Children: The
Relative Effectiveness of Cash and In-Kind Transfers, 8 TAX POLY & THE
ECON. 1 (1994) (suggesting, based on very thin empirical evidence, that some
in-kind transfers may be more effective).
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is "self-sufficiency,"7 but generally do not inquire into what
form of aid actually helps lower-income people enter the social
and economic mainstream.
This Essay argues that the form of assistance does mat-
ter-and that cash transfers are the superior form-for two
main reasons. First, cash transfers are the most cost-effective
type of assistance because cash gives individuals the freedom to
purchase the precise bundle of goods and services that best
meets their particular needs. This freedom to spend is impor-
tant not only because needs can vary greatly across families,
but also because human needs are much more complex than is
suggested by the traditional notion that the basic necessities of
life consist of certain fixed quantities of food, shelter, and cloth-
ing. What seems like a luxury to one person often ends up be-
ing a necessity to another. For example, some people dismiss
stylish clothing as a frivolous expense, yet being dressed a cer-
tain way can be critical to a child who wants to fit in at school
or to an adult seeking respect in the workplace. The flexibility
of cash takes these differences in preferences among individu-
als into account.
Second, cash promotes the social well-being of lower-
income families more effectively than vouchers or in-kind aid.
Cash transfers respect the recipients' dignity and autonomy by
allowing them the same freedom to spend that the rest of soci-
ety enjoys. Non-cash forms of public assistance can be deeply
stigmatizing, as those who have used paper food stamps know
all too well.8 The power to spend cash helps preserve a person's
basic human dignity.
This Essay also carefully considers the leading arguments
against cash transfers, and finds that they tend to rely on com-
mon misperceptions about the lives of people at the bottom of
the economic ladder. For example, conventional fears that
lower-income people will waste money on items like drugs, fast
food, and lottery tickets turn out to be largely unwarranted
when tested against evidence from social science research. In
fact, lower-income people are generally much more careful
when they spend money than their wealthier counterparts.9
7. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1999) (stating that a goal of the
newly-created TANF program is "to enable [parents] to leave the program and
become self-sufficient.").
8. See infra notes 252-55 and accompanying text.
9. See infra Part IV.
2002]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol.86:847
As the above summary suggests, this Essay will focus
solely on the question of what form public assistance should
take. It will not address other key issues of policy design since,
while important, they do not substantially alter the analysis of
what form should be used. Specifically, these other issues in-
clude
1. whether income and wealth should be redistributed,
and by how much; 10
2. how redistribution should be fumded;11
3. who should be running the redistribution process; 12
4. who should be eligible for assistance; 13 and
10. Determining the proper amount of redistribution is a major policy
concern, but as long as some funds are redistributed, regardless of how much
or how little, the question of what form the transfer should take will remain.
It is true, as will be discussed more fully below, that non-cash transfers often
must be fairly large in order to change the recipient's behavior. See infra text
accompanying note 231. But this is the only situation in which the size of the
transfer will have a direct impact on the form it should take. In general,
amount and form of the transfer are separate issues, and the analysis that fol-
lows will be relevant to those who favor very modest amounts of redistribu-
tion, as well as to those who favor much larger-scale efforts.
11. The question of what tax or private mechanism should be used to fund
redistribution is also quite distinct from the question of what form the redis-
tribution should take. Admittedly, some programs, partly for political packag-
ing reasons, are designed so that there is a specific link between the source of
the funds and the way they are spent. For example, the fact that working
people pay into Social Security through a payroll tax surely enhances the pub-
ics perception of the program as a retirement plan, from which a beneficiary
typically expects a check, rather than a set of vouchers. But there is no par-
ticular reason why this must be so, other than public expectations. Likewise,
the form that assistance should take is not affected by whether a program is
funded as an entitlement, so that everyone who meets certain eligibility crite-
ria gets the benefit, or as a discretionary program, in which case benefits are
available only so long as the money lasts.
12. The appropriate form for the transfer is generally independent of who
is doing the redistribution, meaning whether the federal, state, or local gov-
ernment, or a private charity, makes the transfers. While institutional compe-
tencies may vary slightly, in-kind aid, cash transfers, and restricted transfers
can be, and are, done at any of these levels of organization.
13. Defining the population eligible for assistance is a major aspect of
program design. The work requirements mentioned earlier are just one di-
mension of this problem. Distinctions are currently made along numerous
lines, including work status, enrollment in school or job training, number of
children, age, disability, immigration status, veteran status, and various
moral standards (for example, a criminal record or illegal drug use). The per-
sonal characteristics of the recipient rarely affect the form of assistance that is
most appropriate, however. The main exception is people who are incapable of
managing and spending money due to a severe mental disability, but that is a
problem that can be addressed through other means, such as a legal conserva-
tor or guardian. A conservator or guardian essentially stands in the recipi-
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5. when the transfers should be made.14
While the conclusion of the argument presented in this Es-
say is that most public assistance programs should be consoli-
dated into a single cash grant, policymakers need not be over-
whelmed by the prospect of such a seemingly daunting task. It
can be done gradually by cashing out single programs, as some
states have experimented with doing to their food stamp pro-
grams. 15 It can also be accomplished by gradually shifting re-
sources from non-cash programs into any of a number of cash-
based programs that already exist. 6
I. PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN AMERICA
Before turning to the specific arguments for cash-based as-
sistance, following is a brief survey of public assistance as it ex-
ent's place, and can make spending decisions by replicating the choices the
person would have made for himself. Another possible exception is people who
have a demonstrated debilitating addiction to a substance like cocaine or her-
oin, which effectively destroys their ability to make rational decisions about
how to spend money.
MIT economist Lester Thurow has argued, however, that the world cannot
be so neatly divided into those who are competent to handle cash and those
who are not. He concludes, therefore, that "[gliven a continuum of individuals
with varying degrees of competence, transfer systems need a corresponding
continuum of transfers ranging from cash, cash with advice, vouchers, in-kind
provision, and, finally, compulsion." Lester C. Thurow, Government Expendi-
tures: Cash or In-Kind Aid?, in MARKETS AND MORALS 85, 98 (Gerald Dworkin
et al. eds., 1977). But this entails an enormously detailed inquiry into the
competency of individuals, which the state or a private charity may itself be
incompetent at performing, and the costs of which would likely outweigh the
benefits. After all, the worst that can happen is that a small number of people
will lose or waste their money, and that risk is, as will be argued below, worth
taking. See infra text accompanying notes 281-321.
14. Many have argued that the timing of transfers is an important aspect
of program design. Studies of the EITO, in particular, suggest that people
treat annual lump sum payments differently than money that comes in
smaller amounts throughout the year. Jennifer L. Romich & Thomas Weisner,
How Families View and Use the EITC: Advance Payment versus Lump Sum
Delivery, 53 NAVL TAX J. 1245, 1258-60 (2000); Timothy M. Smeeding et al.,
The EITC: Expectation, Knowledge, Use, and Economic and Social Mobility, 53
NAT'L TAX J. 1187, 1188-90 (2000). A further question is whether there should
be a single, once-in-a-lifetime lump sum payment, or whether annual or more
frequent transfers are preferable. BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE
STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 4 (1999) (proposing a one-time grant of $80,000 to
Americans when they reach adulthood). While these questions may be impor-
tant, they do not fundamentally affect the form that the transfer should take.
15. See infra note 99.
16. See infra tbl.2.
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ists in the United States today, in both cash and non-cash
forms, and an overview of the types of proposals for reform that
academic experts and policymakers have made in recent years.
A. THE CURRENT STATE OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
Public assistance will be defined for the purposes of this
discussion as those government programs, privately funded
programs, and tax preferences that are means-tested, meaning
that eligibility is limited to people whose income or assets fall
below a certain level. Means-tested programs are, admittedly,
only one part of a larger system of economic redistribution in
the United States. There are many programs that benefit
lower-income people but are not exclusively reserved for them.
This includes everything from basic municipal services like po-
lice and fire protection to a wide variety of social insurance
programs.17
There are two central reasons for restricting this analysis
to means-tested programs. First, cashing out all programs that
have any tendency to reduce economic inequality would be al-
most unimaginable, and certainly destabilizing to our commu-
nities. Dismantling institutions like public education and
Medicare would wreak havoc on American society, which has
become structured around their existence. Cashing out these
programs would also require well-functioning private markets
17. See, e.g., PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, REAL FREEDOM FOR ALL 42-43 (1995)
(including as part of a proposal for a comprehensive "basic income" the provi-
sion of such services as police protection, a court system, the military, public
education, and infrastructure). Social Security, for example, helps keep eld-
erly people out of poverty and has a somewhat redistributive effect, since
lower-wage workers do currently end up getting a larger share of their wages
replaced in retirement than higher-wage workers. See, e.g., BENJAMIN I. PAGE
& JAMES R. SIMMONS, WHAT GOVERNMENT CAN DO: DEALING WITH POVERTY
AND INEQUALITY 81-83 (2000). The redistributive effect is compounded by the
fact that Social Security benefits are also subject to progressive federal income
tax rates, which effectively reduce the take-home benefit that wealthier people
receive. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 86 (Law. Co-op. 2000), amended by Act of June 7,
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 68. But the benefits are not explicitly
means-tested, and the program helps everyone who participates. Likewise,
many programs funded under federal block grants, such as the Title XX Social
Services Block Grant, the Title V Maternal and Child Health Services Block
Grant, and the Community Services Block Grant primarily benefit lower-
income people, yet eligibility is not always formally restricted. Other major
programs that are not means-tested but which have redistributive effects in-
clude primary and secondary public education; unemployment compensation;
workers' compensation; Medicare; and many other programs for the elderly or
disabled.
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in goods like education and health care, which may not be pos-
sible.18
Second, and more importantly, universally available pro-
grams remedy inequality quite differently from means-tested
programs, and do not cause the same kind of damage to the
dignity of the people who benefit from them. As political ob-
server Mickey Kaus has argued, by bringing together people
from all walks of life, universally available institutions such as
mass transit, libraries, and parks can help foster a sense of so-
cial equality.1 9 Means-tested programs, on the other hand, of-
ten send a message of distrust and not of social equality, by
singling out a group of people and seeking to direct their spend-
ing behavior. While some universally available programs may
also involve a similar distrust, they do not undermine equality
because the message of distrust is directed at every member of
society, regardless of economic status.
Means-tested programs fall into three main categories: in-
kind aid; restricted transfers; and cash transfers. In-kind aid is
the direct provision of a particular good or service, such as an
apartment in a public housing complex. Restricted transfers
consist of money or a money-like currency that can be used to
purchase only certain types of goods or services. Typically, re-
stricted transfers come in voucher form, like paper food stamps.
Restricted transfers can also function as a rebate, where a per-
son first makes a purchase with cash, then is reimbursed. This
is how most targeted tax credits work. Finally, restricted
transfers can come in the form of an electronic benefit transfer
(EBT), which is like an ATM or debit card that can be set up so
that it can only be used for certain purchases. 20 Cash transfers
are the payment of unrestricted money.
The major in-kind and restricted-transfer programs that
currently exist in the United States are listed in Table 1, be-ginning on page 855. Major cash assistance programs are
listed in Table 2, beginning on page 862. These programs are
listed by the type of assistance, not the source. This is because,
from the perspective of a lower-income person seeking assis-
tance, it generally matters little whether the federal, state, or
local government, or a private charity is paying for it; the rele-
18. See infra text accompanying note 229.
19. MICKEY KAUS, THE END OF EQUALITY 96 (1992).
20. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2016(i) (2000), amended by Act of Feb. 11, 2000, 7
U.S.C.S. § 2016 (Law Co-op. Supp. 2000) (describing the process by which food
stamps will be converted from paper form to EBTs by 2002).
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vant question is what kind of assistance is available. The first
table is intended to give the reader a sense of the large number
of non-cash programs in existence today whose purpose is to
provide specific goods and services to lower-income families.
While many of these programs undoubtedly improve the qual-
ity of lower-income peoples' lives, this Essay argues that most
people would be better off if they received this assistance (with
the exception of health care)21 as cash instead. The second table
is intended to provide examples of cash-based programs that
already exist and could be expanded or used as models by poli-
cymakers interested in making the move toward cash-based as-
sistance.
Omitted from the tables are tax subsidies that are techni-
cally means-tested, but which phase out at such high income
levels that they are nearly universal, and tax credits that are
not fully refundable and therefore unavailable to the millions of
Americans who do not earn enough to owe federal income tax.22
Also omitted are loan programs, including various student and
housing loan programs.23 Finally, these tables include only
those programs that provide a direct or nearly direct benefit to
the individual, as opposed to strictly supply-side programs like
the low-income housing tax credit.24
21. See infra text accompanying notes 226-230.
22. The omitted tax subsidies include, for example, the federal Hope and
Lifetime Learning credits for college tuition, 26 U.S.C. § 25A (Supp. V 1999),
amended by Act of June 7, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 59, and the fed-
eral credit for adoption expenses, 26 U.S.C.S. § 23 (Supp. V 1999), amended by
Act of June 7, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 46-49, as well as various
non-refundable state income tax credits.
23. Admittedly, any loan at a below-market interest rate is effectively a
transfer of wealth, but since the money ultimately has to be repaid, a loan
does not permanently increase a family's income in the same way as other
transfers.
24. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (1994 & Supp. V 1999), amended by Act of Dec. 21,
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.
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Table 1: Means-Tested In-Kind Assistance and Restricted
Transfers in the United States Today
In-Kind Assistance Restricted Transfers
(Vouchers & Rebates)
Food N School Lunch Program2 n Food stamps 3s
" School Breakfast Pro- N Special Supplemental
gram26  Nutrition Program for
" Child and Adult Care Women, Infants, and
Food Program27 Children (WIC)36
" Meal supplements for a Food vouchers from pri-
children in after- vate charities37
school care2s - Restaurant meal reim-
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1753, 1759 (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1756-1757 (1994 &
Supp. V 1999); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1755, 1758, 1760 (Law. Co-op. Supp. Oct. 2000);
42 U.S.C. § 1759a (1994 & Supp. V 1999), amended by Act of Nov. 28, 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-76, 115 Stat. 704.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1773 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1766 ( 1994 & Supp. V 1999), amended by Act of June 20,
2000, 42 U.S.C.S. § 1766 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000), and Act of Oct. 30, 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-400, 114 Stat. 1675, and Act of Nov. 9, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
472, 114 Stat. 2073, and Act of Dec. 21, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763, and Act of Nov. 28, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-76, 115 Stat. 704.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1766a (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1761 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1772 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
31. 7 U.S.C. § 612 (2000).
32. 7 U.S.C. § 2013(b) (2000).
33. 7 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7516 (2000).
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11331-11335 (1994).
35. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2036 (2000).
36. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1786 (Law. Co-op. 1990 & Supp. 2001). Note, however,
that while WIC usually provides vouchers, it sometimes can take the form of
direct provision of food. See HARRELL R. RODGERS JR., POOR WOMEN, POOR
CHILDREN 105 (1996).
37. Many charities use vouchers redeemable for a limited number of pur-
chases, typically food, transportation, clothing, or shelter. The Red Cross, for
example, has used vouchers for clothing and food. See DAVID ZUCOHINO,
MYTH OF THE WELFARE QUEEN 117 (1997). Catholic Charities gives out gro-
cery vouchers. See KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET 180
(1997). Some organizations use vouchers specifically to provide assistance to
panhandlers. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 197
(1994) (describing a program in Berkeley, California that provides coupons for
"food, bus fares, or other essentials"). A similar organization founded by Yale
Law Students, called New Haven Cares, sells vouchers to students who are
encouraged to give them to panhandlers in lieu of cash.
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In-Kind Assistance
" Summer Food Service
PrograM29
" Special Milk Program3o
" Commodity Supplemen-
tal Food Program31
" Food Distribution Pro-
gram on Indian Res-
ervations32
Restricted Transfers
(Vouchers & Rebates)
bursements38
n Food pantries and soup
kitchens supported by
private and/or public
sources, including
The Emergency Food
Assistance Program33
and The Emergency
Food and Shelter
Program34
Clothing - Clothing from private N School clothing vouchers
charities39  for welfare recipients4o
a Clothing vouchers from
private charities 41
38. See New York v. Lyng, 829 F.2d 346, 349 (2d Cir. 1987) (describing a
state-funded program of restaurant reimbursements for the homeless and oth-
ers who are unable to cook for themselves).
39. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 179, 184, 233; see also Aimee Berg,
Helping New Workers Look the Part, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2001, at G2 (describ-
ing Dress for Success and other New York-based organizations that give work
outfits to low-income women entering the job market); Suited for Change, at
http://www.suitedforchange.org (last visited March 29, 2002) (website of
Suited for Change, an organization similar to Dress for Success, based in
Washington, D.C.).
40. See, e.g., Rita Dobrich & Joyce Scott, School Clothing Allowance, W.
Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., http'//www.wvdhhr.org/ofs/SCA.htm.
41. See supra note 37; see also EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 113.
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In-Kind Assistance Restricted Transfers
(Vouchers & Rebates)
Housing . Public housing2 0 Section 8 vouchers 47
" Project-based Section 8 * Housing assistance for
vouchers' families moving from
" Shelter Plus Care Pro- welfare to work48
gram" x City housing vouchers 49
" Section 101 rent supple- x Homeownership assis-
ments45  tance50
" Homeless shelters sup- . Various rural housing
ported by private programs5'
and/or public funding, I State income tax credits
42. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1437-1437e, 1437g-1437z (Law. Co-op. 2000 and Supp.
2001).
43. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1437f(c) (Law. Co-op. 2000 and Supp. 2001).
44. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 11403-11407b (Law. Co-op. 1997 & Supp. 2001).
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1701s (2000).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11331-11352 (Law. Co-op. 2000 & Supp. 2001).
47. 42 U.S.C. §1437f(o) (Law. Co-op. 2000 and Supp. 2001).
48. See BARBARA SARD & JEFF LUBELL, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLy
PRIORITIES, THE INCREASING USE OF TANF AND STATE MATCHING FUNDS TO
PROVIDE HOUSING ASSISTANCE TO FAInLIEs MOVING FROM WELFARE TO
WORK (Feb. 17, 2000, supplemented December 3, 2001), httpI//
www.cbpp.org/2-17-00hous.pdf. (last visited March 29, 2002).
49. See, e.g., ZUCCHINO, supra note 37, at 207 (describing transitional
housing vouchers provided by the city of Philadelphia to people on the waiting
list for federal housing assistance).
50. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z (2000); 42 U.S.C.S. § 1437aaa (Law. Co-op. 2000 &
Supp. 2001).
51. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1474, 1490a(a)(2), 1490c, 1490m (Law. Co-op. 2000 &
Supp. 2001).
52. These are sometimes known as "circuit breaker" credits and are typi-
cally available to elderly or disabled lower-income residents. Some states use
their income tax system to provide the credit. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 43-1072
(2001); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 17053.5 (1994); D.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1806.06
(2000); HAW. REV. STAT. § 235-55.7 (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 206.520
(1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 135.020-135.030 (West 2000 & Supp. 2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 15-30-171 to 15-30-179 (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-2-18 (Mi-
chie 2000 & Supp. 2001); N.Y. TAX LAW § 606(e) (McKinney 2001-2002); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 57-02-08.1 (2001); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, §§ 2904-2911 (West
2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 310.635 (1999); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72 §§ 4751-1 to
4751-10 (West 1995 & Supp. 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 44-33-1 to 44-33-19
(1999 & Supp. 2001). Others, including but not limited to those with no state
income tax, provide the credit through the property tax system instead, see,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-170aa to 12-170cc (West 2000), with a par-
allel grant system set up for renters. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-
170d to 12-170h (West 2000).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 604(h) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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including from The
Emergency Food and
Shelter Program
46
for property taxes or
rent 52
Individual Development
Accounts for first-time
home purchase 5D
-t -I- -Health State tax credits for indi-
vidual health insur-
ance64
State tax credits for pre-
scription drugs65
54. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1396-1396u (Law. Co-op. 2001).
55. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1397aa-1397jj (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001).
56. Eligibility for these programs, which exist in more than half of the
states, is generally restricted to the lower-income elderly. See Robert Pear,
States Creating Plans to Reduce Costs for Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2001, at
Al (surveying state programs).
57. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17b-257 (1999 & Supp. 2001).
58. 42 U.S.C.S. § 254b (Law. Co-op. 1994 & Supp. 1999).
59. 8 U.S.C.S. § 1522(e) (Law. Co-op. 1997 & Supp. 2001).
60. 38 U.S.C.S. §§ 1710(a)(1), 1722 (Law. Co-op. 1992 & Supp. 2001).
61. 42 U.S.C. S. § 300a (Law. Co-op. 1991 & Supp. 2001).
62. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 184.
63. See id. at 284 n.22.
64. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-125 (2001) (non-refundable credit,
but targeted at low-income families).
65. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 206.273 (1998); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
135.095 (West 2000).
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" Medicaid54
" State Children's Health
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66. See CYNTHIA M. DUNCAN, WORLDS APART: WHY POVERTY PERSISTS IN
RURAL AAIERICA 48 (1999) (describing deliveries of coal to lower-income fami-
lies by local community action agency); ZELIZER, supra note 37, at 173 (noting
"coal orders" given to lower-income families).
67. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 8621-8629 (Law. Co-op. 1997 & Supp. 2001).
68. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 6861-6873 (Law. Co-op. 1994 & Supp. 2001).
69. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-170e (2000).
70. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 184.
71. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 9831-9852 (Law. Co-op. 1997 & Supp. 2000).
72. Id. § 9840a.
73. Ten states have income tax credits for child care that, unlike the fed-
eral credit, are refundable. See NICHOLAS JOHNSON, TANF FUNDS MAY BE
USED TO CREATE OR EXPAND REFUNDABLE STATE CHILD CARE TAX CREDITS,
CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLVY PRIORITIES, http://www.cbpp.org/10-11-00sfp.htm.
(Oct. 11, 2000).
74. 42 U.S.C. §9858 (Law. Co-op. 1997 & Supp. 2000).
75. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HULAN SERVICES, TEMPORARY
ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF) PROGRAM: THIRD ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS 179 (2000), http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/opre/annual3.pdf
(last modified Aug. 2000).
76. 20 U.S.C. § 1070e (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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ernment-funded ergy Assistance Pro-
community organiza- gram 67
tions66  . Weatherization Assis-
tance6s
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77. 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 2801-2872 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 607(d)(5), (6), (8), (9) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
79. 20 U.S.C.S. §§ 1070a-11 to 1070a-18 (Law. Co-op. 1999 & Supp. 2001).
80. 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 2881-2901 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001).
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1070a (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
82. See Todd S. Purdum, California Enacts Expansive College Aid Plan,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 12, 2000, at A16 (describing programs in California and
New York).
83. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070b (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
84. See 20 U.S.C.S. § 1070c (Law. Co-op. 1999 & Supp. 2001).
85. South Carolina and New York have both recently enacted refundable
credits for college tuition. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-3385 (West 2000) (en-
acted in 1998); N.Y. TAX LAW § 606(t) (Consol. Supp. 2001) (enacted in 2000).
Several other states have nonrefundable credits.
86. Only Minnesota currently has a refundable credit for K-12 educational
expenses. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 290.0674 (West Supp. 2002). Several other
states have nonrefundable credits.
87. 42 U.S.C. § 604(h) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
88. 20 U.S.C.S. §§ 1134-1134c (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001).
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89. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 2996-29961 (Law. Co-op. 2000 & Supp. 2001).
90. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 179,233.
91. See id. at 179.
92. See PAUL MAJERS, TRANSPORTATION IN WELFARE REFORM, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUmIAN SERVS., OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, http'I/
www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/ofafTRANS2.HTM (June 1999) (describing the
transportation assistance provided by each state with its TANF and state
matching funds). Some assistance is in-kind, such as bus tokens; other assis-
tance, such as mileage reimbursement, is in the form of a restricted transfer.
See id.
93. See id.
In-Kind Assistance Restricted Transfers
(Vouchers & Rebates)
Misc. 0 Legal Services89  n Transportation assis-
• Toys and holiday gifts tance for families mov-
from private chari- ing from welfare to
ties90  work93
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Table 2: Means-Tested Cash-Based Public Assistance in the
United States Today
Traditional wel- Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
fare (cash assistance portion)94
State or local General Assistance 95
Emergency payments under state welfare diver-
sion programs 96
Refugee assistance97
General assistance for Indians98
Cashed-out food stamps99
94. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 601-619 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001). TANF is the succes-
sor to the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program.
95. See Gallagher, supra note 3, at 1, 3. Note, however, that some state
general assistance programs offer vouchers instead of cash. See id. at 1.
96. See Barbara Vobejda & Judith Havemann, States' Welfare Shift: Stop
It Before It Starts; 'Diversion' to Alternatives Cuts Caseload, WASH. POST, Aug.
12, 1998, at Al. Some states, however, severely restrict the use of these cash
transfers. See, e.g., State of Connecticut, Governor Rowland Announces New
Program to Help Keep People Off Welfare, http'//www.dss.state.ct.us/pressrelY
980930.htm (last modified Sept. 30, 1998).
97. 8 U.S.C. § 1522(e) (2000).
98. 25 U.S.C.S. §§ 13d to 13d-3 (Law. Co-op. 2001).
99. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2026(d), 2030-2031 (2000) (allowing for state cash-outs of
food stamps); id. § 2028 (providing for the Nutrition Assistance Program in
Puerto Rico, a cashed-out food stamp program); see also Thomas M. Fraker et
al., The Effect of Food Stamp Cashout on Food Expenditures: An Assessment of
the Findings from Four Demonstrations, 30 J. HUM. RES. 633, 635 (1995) (de-
scribing cash-out demonstration projects in Alabama, San Diego County, and
Washington state); Virginia Knox et al., Reforming Welfare and Rewarding
Work: A Summary of the Final Report on the Minnesota Family Investment
Program, Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation, http'J/
www.mdrc.org/Reports2000/MFIP/MFIPSummary.htm (2000) (describing the
Minnesota Family Investment Program, a demonstration project conducted
from 1994 to 1996 that included the cashing out of food stamps).
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Refundable tax Federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)100
credits State Earned Income Tax CreditsI01
Federal child creditl02
Disability Supplemental Security Income (SSI)103
programs State supplement programs 04
State disability programs'0 5
Non-service-connected disability pension for vet-
erans'0 6
Other Foster care assistance 0 7
Adoption assistance108
Cash assistance from private charities'0 9
There are no estimates of the total value of these various
forms of public assistance because comprehensive data on
spending by private charities is not readily available. Esti-
mates of total government spending on public assistance, how-
ever, suggest that about twenty-four percent consists of cash
transfers, while the rest is in-kind aid or restricted transfers.1 10
The growth in government spending on non-cash public as-
100. See 26 U.S.C.S. § 32 (Law. Co-op. 2000).
101. See NICHOLAS JOHNSON, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLY PRIORITIES, A
HAND UP: How STATE EARNED INcoME TAX CREDITS HELP WORKING
FAMILIES ESCAPE POVERTY IN 2001, at 7, http'//www.cbpp.org/12-27-Olsfp.pdf
(2001) (reporting that Washington, D.C. and ten states offer a refundable
earned income tax credit based on the federal EITC: Colorado; Kansas; Mary-
land; Massachusetts; Minnesota; New Jersey; New York; Oklahoma; Wiscon-
sin; and Vermont).
102. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-16, § 201(c), 115 Stat. 45 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 24(d)).
103. 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 1381-1383 (Law. Co-op. 2000 & Supp. 2001).
104. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1382g (Law. Co-op. 2000).
105. See, e.g., 55 PA. CODE §§ 451.1-.5 (2000) (describing the rules govern-
ing Pennsylvania's State Blind Pension program).
106. 38 U.S.C.S. §§ 1521-1522 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001).
107. 42 U.S.C.S. § 672 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2001).
108. 42 U.S.C.S. § 673 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000).
109. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 184.
110. See COAM. ON WAYS & MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
THE 2000 GREEN BOOK 1394 (2000).
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sistance has significantly outpaced the growth in cash-based
public assistance over the last twenty-five years."' Swiftly ris-
ing health care costs are largely responsible for the increase in
non-cash transfers. Spending on health care programs now ac-
counts for half of all government-funded public assistance. 112
But other non-cash programs have grown as well.113 State-
funded assistance, including safety net programs for people in-
eligible for federal assistance-some because they have reached
the five-year federal time limit under TANF-are increasingly
in the form of vouchers, electronic benefits, and other non-cash
aid. 114 In addition, both the federal and state governments
have been enacting various targeted tax credits, which, al-
though generally aimed at the middle class, are part of a larger
trend toward restricted transfers.1 5 In contrast, the real, infla-
tion-adjusted value of spending on Aid to Families with De-
pendent Children (AFDC), a largely cash-based program, grew
very little and the real value of its per-family benefit declined
significantly. 116 Federal spending on the TANF program, which
replaced AFDC in 1997, has likewise been falling in real
terms, 117 with a shrinking share of the funds devoted to cash
assistance, and a growing share to restricted transfers of vari-
ous forms. 118
The main exception to the trend away from cash assistance
has been the Earned Income Tax Credit. The federal EITC is
an income tax credit that is available through a "refund"
check-even to people who do not owe any federal income
111. See id. at 1400 tbl.K-4.
112. See id. at 1394.
113. See id. at 1400 tbl.K-4.
114. See Editorial, Welfare's Next Phase, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2001, at A18
(describing the program set up by New York State for people who have
reached federal time limits for welfare, saying, "The state plan doles out very
little cash. Instead it will pay rent, utilities and other costs, either directly or
through a debit card."); Gallagher, supra note 3, at 1; LIZ SCHOTT, CTR. ON
BUDGET AND POL'Y PRIORITIES, WAYS THAT STATES CAN SERVE FAMILiEs
THAT REACH WELFARE TIME LIMITS 16-17, http//www.cbpp.org6-21-
00wel.pdf. (2000).
115. See supra note 22.
116. See SUSAN E. MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY: FAMILY INCOME AND
CHILDREN'S LIFE CHANCES 31-33 (1997).
117. See ZOE NEUBERGER ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLY PRIORITIES,
FUNDING ISSUES IN TANF REAUTHORIZATION, http'/www.cbpp.org/ll-30-
01wel.pdf. (Feb. 5, 2002) ("[TANF's] inflation-adjusted value fell by more than
11 percent between fiscal year 1997 and fiscal year 2002.").
118. See id.
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taxes-provided that they have been working and earning an
income. The federal EITC has steadily grown over time, with
significant expansions in 1986,119 1990,120 and 1993,121 and a
more modest increase in the tax bill signed into law by Presi-
dent Bush in the spring of 2001.122 At $30 billion per year, the
EITC is now a greater source of redistributed federal dollars
than either TANF or food stamps.123 Many states have also re-
cently enacted their own EITCs. 124 In a related provision, the
tax bill signed into law in the spring of 2001 also expanded the
per-child tax credit to make it partially refundable for low-
income working parents.
B. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Following is a survey of some of the leading proposals to
reshape public assistance put forward by academics and poli-
cymakers. The purpose of this brief discussion is not to provide
an exhaustive catalogue of policy options, but rather to demon-
strate that both cash and non-cash transfers are considered vi-
able alternatives by those seeking to reform public assistance.
1. Non-Cash Assistance Proposals
Proposals to reform public assistance through new forms of
non-cash assistance have come from a variety of sources. In
the academic world, Yale Law School professors Michael Graetz
and Jerry Mashaw have championed restricted transfers in
their 1999 proposal for a major overhaul of social insurance.126
While their overall program seeks to move away from means
testing and make public assistance far more broad-based than
it is today, they do propose a number of means-tested transfers
119. See Tax Reform Act of 1986 § 111, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085
(1986).
120. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 § 11111, Pub. L. No.
101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
12L See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 §§ 13131(a)-(e), 26
U.S.C.S. § 32 (Law. Co-op. 2000).
122. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 §
303(a), Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 55 (2001) (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. §
32).
123. See Smeeding et al., supra note 14, at 1187.
124. See JOHNSON, supra note 101, at 7.
125. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 32).
126. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY 145-320
(1999).
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to prevent child poverty.127 Graetz and Mashaw concede the
appeal of cash transfers, but conclude they are neither politi-
cally feasible nor the most effective way to keep children out of
poverty. 128 As a result, while many of Graetz and Mashaw's
more universal proposals-such as those for unemployment or
disability insurance-remain cash based, they suggest helping
lower-income families with children through restricted trans-
fers for housing and child care. 129 Graetz and Mashaw do not
argue against cashing out food stamps for families with chil-
dren, however. 130 Barbara Bergmann, an economist and
prominent academic advocate of restricted transfers, recently
proposed a similar system of vouchers for child care and hous-
ing as part of a comprehensive "Help for Working Parents" pro-
gram.13
1
Several national political leaders have also promoted re-
stricted transfers, particularly for child care. Former President
George Bush proposed making the child and dependent care
tax credit refundable in 1989;132 more recently, former Presi-
dent Bill Clinton included a refundable child care credit in his
final budget request,133 and former Senator Bill Bradley made
the refundable credit and increased in-kind child care assis-
tance part of his platform in his bid for the 2000 Democratic
presidential nomination. 34
A different type of restricted transfer that has recently
garnered a fair amount of political support is the Individual
Development Account (IDA). First conceived of by Washington
University's Michael Sherraden, IDAs are savings accounts for
specified purchases-such as a first-time home purchase, school
tuition, or business start-up costs-that typically involve gov-
127. See id. at 63-64.
128. See id. at 234.
129. See id. at 243, 247.
130. See id. at 237.
131. See BARBARA R. BERGMANN, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM POVERTY:
WHAT THE UNITED STATES CAN LEARN FROM FRANCE 125-27 (1996).
132. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Beyond President Bush's Child Tax
Credit Proposal: Towards a Comprehensive System of Tax Credits to Help Low-
Income Families with Children, 38 EMORY L.J. 661, 674-76 (1989).
133. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 258 (2000).
134. See James Dao, Bradley Challenges Nation to Eliminate Child Pov-
erty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1999, at A22.
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ernment matching funds for individual contributions.135 The
United States Department of Health and Human Services is
currently funding several IDA programs 136 and President
George W. Bush proposed an additional $25 million for IDAs in
his first budget request, as well as a tax credit for private fi-
nancial institutions that set up similar accounts with their own
matching funds. 137 Other academics have proposed a similar
concept, called human capital accounts. These accounts would
be transfers to young people, who could then make withdrawals
for specified purposes, such as higher education, job training, or
medical expenses. 138
2. Cash Transfer Proposals
There are two types of cash transfer proposals that policy-
makers and academics frequently suggest: a basic income,
which is made available to a broad population, and wage subsi-
dies, which are available to those who work. A basic income is a
universal cash transfer, taxable according to the same progres-
sive income tax structure as other income. A similar concept is
the negative income tax, which is a cash transfer only to people
whose incomes fall below a certain level. 139 Ralph Nader called
for a federal negative income tax as a third-party candidate for
the presidency in 2000,140 but the concept did not originate with
Nader; rather, it has deep historical roots. The Johnson Ad-
ministration initiated a series of negative income tax experi-
ments in the late 1960s, 141 and in 1969, President Richard
Nixon proposed a "Family Assistance Plan," which would have
provided a minimum annual $1600 cash grant to a family of
135. See MICHAEL SHERRADEN, ASSETS AND THE POOR: A NEW AMERICAN
WELFARE POLICY 220-75 (1991).
136. 42 U.S.C. § 604(h) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
137. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, ExECUTIvE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT: FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 111 (2001).
138. See ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 14, at 215 (describing human
capital account proposals by Yale economist James Tobin, Harvard Law pro-
fessor Roberto Unger, and others).
139. For a more detailed explanation of how a basic income or negative in-
come tax would work, see Anne L. Alstott, Work vs. Freedom: A Liberal Chal-
lenge to Employment Subsidies, 108 YALE L.J. 967, 977-78 (1999).
140. See Peter Y. Hong, Nader Targets Candidates on Child Poverty, L.4
TIEs, June 27, 2000, at All.
141. See VINCENT J. BURKE & LEE BURKE, NIXON'S GOOD DEED: WELFARE
REFORM 21-22 (1974).
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four. 142  Presidential candidate George McGovern echoed
Nixon's proposal in 1972, when he called for a $1000 annual
cash grant, which he termed a "demogrant."' 43 While Nixon's
plan passed the House of Representatives, 144 it never made it
through the Senate. 145 The plan did, however, lead to the crea-
tion of Supplemental Security Income (SSI),146 a system of fed-
erally funded cash transfers to the low-income elderly and dis-
abled. 147
A number of academics have also promoted the concept of a
basic income. In the 1960s, Nobel Prize-winning economists
Milton Friedman 148 and James Tobin i49 were leading advocates
of a basic income or negative income tax. In the 1990s, Euro-
pean political theorist Philippe Van Parijs proposed a more
ambitious universal basic income of the "highest sustainable"
amount. 150 Many other academics have made similar propos-
als.151 Yale Law School professors Bruce Ackerman and Anne
Alstott have proposed a lump sum grant of $80,000 to each
American when he or she reaches adulthood. 152 This is essen-
tially an unrestricted cash-based version of the human capital
account proposal mentioned above. 153 British Prime Minister
142. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 91ST CONG., THE PRESIDENTS
PROPOSALS FOR WELFARE REFORM AND SOCIAL SECURITY AMENDMENTS 43-45
(Comm. Print 1969).
143. See THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1972, at
119 (1973).
144. See DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE POLITICS OF A GUARANTEED INCOME
437 (1973) (describing the 243-155 vote in the House on April 16, 1970 in favor
of the Family Assistance Act).
145. See id. at 439.
146. See BURKE & BURKE, supra note 141, at 188-89.
147. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1381-1383f (Law. Co-op. 2000 & Supp. 2001).
148. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 191-92 (1962).
149. See James Tobin, The Case for an Income Guarantee, 4 PUB. INT. 31,
36-38 (1966); see also James Tobin et al., Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?,
77 YALE L.J. 1, 1-4 (1967) (discussing some of the technical design issues
raised by negative income tax proposals).
150. See VAN PARIJS, supra note 17; Philippe Van Parijs, A Basic Income
for All, BOSTON REV., Oct.-Nov. 2000, at 4.
151. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate
Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1965
(1987); Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax Credit,
and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. Cmi. L. REV. 405, 469 (1997); see also Basic
Income European Network, http://www.basicincome.org (last visited March 29,
2002) (an organization of "individuals and groups committed to, or interested
in, basic income").
152. ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 14, at 4.
153. See id. at 215.
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Tony Blair recently proposed a scaled-back version of the Ac-
kerman-Alstott grant, in which the government would create a
savings account for each newborn child that would grow in
value to between $4500 and $7500 by the time the child
reached age eighteen. 154
Wage subsidies, which are cash supplements paid to people
with earnings from work, are a type of cash transfer that has
attracted a fair amount of support in the academic and political
arenas. In 1997, Columbia economist Edmund Phelps proposed
a $125 billion wage subsidy plan. 155 A related approach, pro-
posed by many, is to expand the EITC, which functions as a
wage subsidy because it is available only to low-income work-
ers. Expanding the size of the EITC is a popular idea in pro-
gressive political circles. President Clinton proposed a major
EITC expansion in his final budget request,156 and former Vice
President Al Gore and former Senator Bill Bradley both pro-
posed an EITC expansion during their 2000 presidential cam-
paigns.1 57 Several states also enacted or expanded an EITC in
2000.158 Proposals for cash assistance to non-working adults,
on the other hand, have been few and far between. Exceptions
include state experiments with cashing out food stamps, 159 and
proposals for a fully refundable federal child tax credit.160
154. See David S. Broder, Tony Blair's Eye-Catchers, WASH. POST, May 2,
2001, at A21.
155. See EDMIND S. PHELPS, REWARDING WORK: HOW TO RESTORE
PARTICIPATION AND SELF-SUPPORT TO FREE ENTERPRISE 105-116 (1997).
156. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, supra note 133, at 258 (2000) (in-
cluding a 10-year, $23.6 billion proposal to expand the EITC to provide tax re-
lief for 6.8 million working families).
157. See David E. Rosenbaum, Study Finds Winners and Losers for Bush
and Gore Tax Proposals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2000, at A23 (noting Gore support
for EITC expansion); Louis Uchitelle, The Sounds of Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
19, 1999, at 4-4 (noting Bradley support for EITC expansion).
158. See Johnson, supra note 101, at 6. Johnson notes,
In the 2000 and 2001 legislative sessions, ten states (counting the
District of Columbia as a state) enacted new Earned Income Tax
Credits or expanded existing state EITCs. The District of Columbia,
Illinois, Maine, New Jersey, and Oklahoma enacted new EITCs.
Colorado, Maryland, Minnesota, New York, and Vermont substan-
tially expanded existing EITCs.
Altogether, sixteen states now offer EITCs based on the federal credit.
Id. (citation omitted). Note that not all of these are refundable credits. See id.
at7.
159. See supra note 99.
160. See, e.g., CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, MAKING THE CHILD TAX CREDIT
REFUNDABLE, http'//www.cdfactioncouncil.org/refundability-child_credit.htm
(Jan. 26, 2001); NATIONAL COAMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND RHETORIC: A
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II. THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS ARGUMENT FOR CASH
TRANSFERS
A. THE ECONOMIST'S CASE FOR CASH
Until North Korea went into economic free fall in the early 1990's, all
citizens received the staples of life-food, housing, clothing, jobs and
medical care-free from the government. 161
For a country that prides itself on its free markets, it is
remarkable how closely public assistance programs in the
United States resemble the constructs of a communist regime.
Indeed, the argument for the cost-effectiveness of cash-based
assistance is grounded in basic market economics. Simply put,
cash transfers maximize the utility, or value, gained from the
transfer because they allow the recipient family to spend the
money in accordance with its particular preferences. Restricted
transfers or in-kind aid, on the other hand, will not necessarily
match the family's preferences, so they will generate less utility
for the family. If society wants the greatest possible return on
its dollar, it should use cash as a means of redistributing
wealth and income. This has elsewhere been described as the
economist's argument. 162
Using public housing as an example, economist Milton
Friedman has argued that
NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 94 (1991).
161. Elisabeth Rosenthal, Collapse of Health System Adds to North Korea's
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2001, at Al, A8.
162. See BERGMANN, supra note 131, at 130 ("Most economists have taken
the position that government benefits are best given in the form of cash,
rather than in the form of goods and services or vouchers."); PAGE & SIMMONS,
supra note 17, at 273 ("To a number of economists... the best way to combat
poverty seems obvious: give poor people money.... Let poor people maximize
their satisfaction for each dollar spent, and let private markets respond by
providing whatever people will pay for."); ZELIZER, supra note 37, at 196
("[U]nrestricted cash payments to the poor have gained new allies, namely
economists who invoke the principle of consumer sovereignty to argue against
the government's inefficient attempt to 'distort individual consumption deci-
sions' by providing aid in kind.") (citation omitted); Thomas C. Schelling, Eco-
nomic Reasoning and the Ethics of Policy, 63 PUB. INT. 37, 60 (1981). Schel-
ling states,
A... touchstone of market economics is the idea that most people
are better at spending their own money than somebody else is at
spending it for them.
o.. [Glenerally the economist thinks the burden of proof belongs
on those who want to give food stamps or subway tokens or eyeglasses
to the poor and the elderly, not money.
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[ilf funds are to be used to help the poor, would they not be used more
effectively by being given in cash rather than in kind? Surely, the
families being helped would rather have a given sum in cash than in
the form of housing. They could themselves spend the money on
housing if they so desired. Hence, they would never be worse off if
given cash; if they regarded other needs as more important, they
would be better off.
163
Friedman was joined in this view by a majority of his fel-
low economists. A survey of American economists taken about
twenty years ago found that sixty-eight percent agreed with the
statement "Cash payments are superior to transfers-in-kind."r4
Another twenty-four percent partly agreed, and only eight per-
cent disagreed with the statement.165
Critics of this argument contest the notion that the only
goal of public assistance is to maximize the recipients' utility.
Lester Thurow observed that this formulation neglects the
other side of the equation, which is the impact on the utility of
the donor 166 (i.e. the taxpayer or contributor to a private char-
ity). If the utility gain to the donor of transferring income de-
pends on the recipient spending it on a particular good or ser-
vice, then while a cash transfer may increase the recipient's
utility, it will simultaneously result in a loss of utility to the
donor if the recipient chooses to spend it on something other
than the donor's preferred good.1 67 For example, suppose that
taxpayers support the food stamp program because they are
happier living in a society where people never go hungry. If
food stamps are cashed out, and some people choose to spend
the money on new clothes instead of food, then these taxpayers
will feel that the money spent on that clothes-buying group has
been wasted. Not only do these taxpayers fail to gain any per-
sonal happiness from the transfer, but they have also lost the
money spent on the program, which they could have used to
generate utility for themselves in some other way.
There is nothing wrong with this analytical framework; the
problem is that we do not know whether donor utility does, in
fact, depend on the consumption of particular goods or services.
The key question, in other words, is why do we choose, as a so-
ciety, to redistribute income to those who are less well off?.
There are many possible reasons. Some have argued that it is
163. FRIEDMAN, supra note 148, at 178.
164. J.R. Kearl et al., What Economists Think: A Confusion of Economists?,
AMI. ECON. REV., May 1979, at 28, 30.
165. Id.
166. See THUROW, supra note 13, at 88.
167. See id.
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because we think people have rights to certain basic necessi-
ties, such as food, shelter, and medical care. 168 This is perhaps
derived from a more fundamental concept (whether secular or
religious) of a "right to live."16 9 Alternatively, since so many
public assistance programs target families with children, per-
haps society wants to improve the lives of children. This could
stem from a moral sense that children are blameless and
should not have to suffer because their parents are poor. 170
There also exist more selfish reasons, such as the desire for
children to grow up to be productive, 171 law-abiding 172 citizens.
These self-regarding reasons may also apply to public assis-
tance for adults, since "by providing welfare and social services
to poor people, government and social services give the rest of
168. See GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 126, at 49 ("[Mlost of us are not
concerned simply that our fellow citizens may have insufficient cash. Instead,
as contributors to the well-being of the disadvantaged, taxpayers seem con-
cerned about material deprivation with respect to basic necessities such as
food, shelter, child care, and medical care."); PAGE & SIMMONS, supra note 17,
at 285; Steven Pearlstein, Should the Tax System Redistribute the Wealth?,
WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2001, at Hi, H4 (quoting pollster Mark Penn as saying
"Americans strongly support the concept that nobody who works should be
without the basic necessities of life. But outside that framework, people don't
want to see policies whose primary purpose is to redistribute income.").
169. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE
RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1960-1973, at 37-39 (1993) (describing Edward V.
Sparer's advocacy of a constitutional "right to live" as a central goal of the wel-
fare rights movement); Steven Kelman, A Case for In-Kind Transfers, 2 ECON.
& PHIL. 55, 59-61 (1986).
170. See, e.g., GRAETz & MASHAW, supra note 126, at 120 ("Poverty status
in general is too dependent on personal incentives and actions to be a good
candidate for aggressive social insurance interventions. But from this per-
spective childhood poverty is different. Children's actions are not implicated
in their poverty.").
171. See, e.g., id. ("[Slociety has a special stake in preventing childhood
poverty. A nation wants its children to become productive adults."); VALERIE
POLAKOW, LIVES ON THE EDGE: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN IN
THE OTHER AMERICA 101 (1993) ("[Hlealth and nutritional programs for preg-
nant or nursing mothers and their babies have been justified in terms of the
avoidance of future economic costs, rather than on positive humanitarian
grounds.").
172. See, e.g., POLAKOW, supra note 171, at 101 (quoting the governor of
Kentucky, who stated in 1986, "Early childhood programs cost money-
sometimes a lot of it. But crime costs more."); Patrick J. Sullivan, Jr., Letter
to the Editor, Conservatives Should Fight for Good Child Care, WASH. TIIvIES,
June 14, 2000, at A18 (letter from Arapahoe County, Colorado sheriff arguing,
on behalf of the National Sheriffs' Association, that child care funding should
be increased because "[situdies clearly prove that failing to help working par-
ents get good child care for at-risk children can quintuple our risk that chil-
dren will grow up to victimize us.") (citation omitted).
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society protection against other means that poor people could
use to obtain what they need (such as taking it)."173 Other ra-
tionales for redistribution include promoting equal citizen-
ship; 74 providing a safety net or social insurance against the
risk of economic disaster;175 or allowing everyone a chance to
pursue "the American dream."176
With the exception of the rights to basic necessities formu-
lation, none of these visions provide a sufficient level of detail
to answer the question of whether the donor's utility comes
from the consumption of specific goods, from enhancing the re-
cipient's purchasing power, or a combination thereof. Even if
there were a clear answer to this question, public opinion may
be fairly malleable on this issue, so public policy should proba-
bly not turn entirely on it. As Steven Kelman of Harvard's
Kennedy School of Government has observed,
[The strength of people's preferences for helping the disadvantaged is
not fixed. It can vary depending on the context in which the issue is
presented.... [P]resenting the problems of the disadvantaged in a
multiplicity of contexts, tied to specific problems they face, will tend
to increase the willingness of the non-disadvantaged to help, com-
pared to a situation where the problem is presented in a single ab-
stract context. 177
In other words, the nature of the donor's utility function
may depend on his understanding of the recipient's utility func-
tion. Kelman believes that the donor public's understanding of
recipients' needs is quite limited. For example, one can foster
173. See LINDA R. ALwITr & THOMAS D. DONLEY, THE Low-INCoME
CONSUMIER: ADJUSTING THE BALANCE OF EXCHANGE 159 (1996) (citing R.P.
Bagozzi, Marketing as Exchange, 39 J. MARETING 32 (1975)).
174. See, e.g., ACKERAAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 14, at 183 (arguing for
redistribution in pursuit of "the republican ideal of free and equal citizen-
ship").
175. See, e.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 392
(3d ed. 2000) ("Knowing that adversity can strike anyone, individuals may
think, 'There but for the grace of God go I.' The knowledge that there is a
safety net adds to their sense of economic security, and thus to their overall
well-being."); see also GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 126, at 149 (observing
that the social insurance vision serves the dual function of not only redistrib-
uting income to the poor, but also of smoothing family income over the life cy-
cle).
176. See, e.g., Richard W. Stevenson, In a Time of Plenty, The Poor Are Still
Poor, N.Y. TIIES, Jan. 23, 2000, at WK3 (quoting Senator Ted Kennedy of
Massachusetts as saying "As a society, we must answer an increasingly urgent
question. What can we do to close the widening gap in income and skills that
leaves too many Americans unable to participate fully in the American
Dream?").
177. Kelman, supra note 169, at 69.
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public support for food stamps, he says, by talking about people
who are going hungry, but one cannot build support for cash,
because the discussion of needs would be too abstract. 178
Kelman may be underestimating the American people. If
the public is capable of more sophisticated understanding and
can comprehend the complexity and variability of human
needs, it may be willing to make cash transfers. It is to that
complexity that we now turn.
B. WHEN LUXURIES ARE BAsIcs
A system of restricted and in-kind transfers cannot be as
cost-effective as cash unless it targets the specific set of goods
and services that will most improve the recipients' lives. It
might seem easy, from an outsider's perspective, to define that
set of goods and services. After all, we all have an instinctive
sense of what is needed in order to function in society. We usu-
ally call these the basic necessities of life, and most people
would describe them as food, shelter, clothing, and medical
care. But how do we arrive at this list? Economists Trudi Ren-
wick and Barbara Bergmann suggest that
People of ample means who are asked about the income required for
minimum adequacy will probably arrive at a response by taking their
own budgets and mentally stripping them of purchases, such as alco-
hol, expensive footwear, and gambling stakes, that they consider to be
luxuries and vices. Lower-income people, however, may configure
their actual purchases quite differently. After all, they are leading
the difficult life that most [higher-income people] are merely thinking
about momentarily.
17 9
Studies of lower-income families confirm this observation
about the complexity of their needs. Kathryn Edin and Laura
Lein's in-depth examination of the lives of lower-income moth-
ers across the United States revealed that the women some-
times skimp on "necessities" (which they defined as housing;
food; medical care; clothing; transportation; child care; phone
service; laundry/toiletries/cleaning supplies; baby care; school
supplies and fees; appliances; and furniture) 180 in order to
spend on such "nonnecessary" items as entertainment (usually
video rentals, but occasionally movies, trips to amusement
parks, or travel to visit a relative), cable television, cigarettes,
178. See id. at 69-70.
179. Trudi J. Renwick & Barbara R. Bergmann, A Budget-Based Definition
of Poverty, 28 J. HUM. RES. 1, 11 (1993).
180. See EDIN & LEiN, supra note 37, at 23, tbl.2-1.
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alcohol, restaurant meals, or lottery tickets.181 Why do these
women forgo necessities in favor of seemingly avoidable expen-
ditures? Edin and Lein explain:
Although not physical necessities, the ["nonnecessary] items met
crucial psychological needs.
Although the mothers in our sample worried about day-to-day ma-
terial survival, most saw survival as having broader "psychological"
and "social" dimensions. One mother commented: "You know, we live
in a materialistic world. Our welfare babies have needs and wants
too. They see other kids going to the circus, having toys and stuff like
that. You gotta do what you gotta do to make your kid feel normal.
There is no way you can deprive your child."
182
Women spend on "luxuries" for themselves as well as their
children. As one woman explained,
"I never buy for myself, only for my son. Well, I take that back. I al-
low myself two of what I guess you would call luxuries. Well, I guess
three. First, I buy soda pop. I do not eat meals hardly ever, but I al-
ways have to have a can of Pepsi in my hand .... I guess it's the pop
that gives me my energy for dealing with my son-you know, the
sugar and caffeine and stuff.
"And then I treat myself to the cigarettes. Without the smoking, I
would just worry all the time about how we was [sic] going to eat and
would never relax....
"And the other thing is, I buy my cosmetics. I mean, I go around
feeling so low all the time, and the makeup makes me feel, you know,
better about myself. I feel like I'm not so poor when I can buy myself
some cosmetics at the discount house."
183
What are these "luxury" goods that serve fundamental psy-
chological and social needs? They differ somewhat from family
to family. Buying a can of soda or new makeup is what it takes
for one person to feel less poor, while to another taking the kids
to the circus is what matters. Even the most sophisticated
voucher system imaginable could not address all of these needs.
Cash transfers are the only way to ensure that people can get
the precise set of goods and services that meets their basic emo-
tional needs.
One "luxury" good that lower-income families need the
flexibility of cash to obtain is clothing. On a certain level,
clothes are viewed as a necessity, for modesty and warmth rea-
sons, if nothing else. Curiously, however, clothing is the only
one of the four stereotypical basic necessities (the others being
food, shelter, and medical care) that is not provided through a
181. See id. at 15, 23, 30.
182. Id. at 30.
183. Id. at 31.
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traditional public assistance program. Presumably, this is be-
cause Goodwill, the Salvation Army, and other charities al-
ready provide a ready supply of free or very low-cost clothing,
and very little clothing is needed to avoid having to walk the
streets naked or cold.
A closer look at the role that clothing plays in our lives,
however, demonstrates the inherent flaws in the idea that one
person can define another's needs. Clothes are not just a
means of staying warm and covering ourselves; they also play a
key role in self-expression1 84 and in how others perceive us.185
This is true for most adults, but it is doubly true for young chil-
dren and teenagers. Not only are kids constantly outgrowing
their clothes, but clothes can also affect how well they fit in at
school. Lower-income parents want to be able to provide new
clothes for their children. When they do have cash to spend, of-
ten clothes are the first things they buy.186 Many lower-income
adults grew up poor and remember how difficult it was not to
have clothes like everyone else. 8 7 Many get pressure from
184. See ZELIZER, supra note 37, at 149 (describing the theory among early
twentieth-century social scientists that clothing, if selected and purchased by
the poor themselves, could be a "vehicle for self-expression").
185. See GRANT MCCRACKEN, CULTURE AND CONSUMPTION 98 (1988) ("It is
widely noted that clothing serves a communicative, cultural function in large
part through its ability to express distinct categories within status, age, gen-
der, class, occupation, marital status, religion, and politics."); id. at 57-70 (de-
scribing the various expressive properties of clothing).
186. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 156 (describing a woman who gets
cash gifts from her boyfriend and uses them to buy sneakers and clothing for
her children); ZUCCHINO, supra note 37, at 226 (describing a homeless woman
in Philadelphia who "took a city bus to the Rainbow discount store on Front
Street, where she bought new clothes for school; she did not want Destiny
wearing donated clothes with worn spots and stains"); Romich & Weisner, su-
pra note 14, at 1259 (noting that "[tiwo-thirds of the parents in [Romich and
Weisner's study] who receive[d] the EITC or a substantial tax refund cite[d]
expenditures on children as a priority use of [the] check.... Clothes [were] the
most commonly cited child-specific purchase."); Kevin Sack, Want A Tax Cut?
You Bet. Well, Maybe Not., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2001, at A22 (reporting that
when asked how she would spend a tax cut, a twenty-one-year-old mill worker
said she would buy new clothes for her two children); cf JOHN E. SCHWARTZ &
THOMAS J. VOLGY, THE FORGOTTEN AMERICANS 21 (1992) (describing low-
income parents who rely on grandparents to buy new clothes for the kids).
187. See DUNCAN, supra note 66, at 41 (quoting a thirty-year-old woman
recalling, "Kids made fun of me because of not having decent clothes and
things. Most of what we had was hand-me-downs, this one to that one, to
make ends meet. You just never fit in."); MAYER, supra note 116, at 52 ("A
young student teacher ... explained that because of her family's poverty, 'I
didn't fit in (with other children) style-wise. I've never fit in style-wise, I
mean--clothes-wise."); id. at 98 ("[Some people] seem to think that children
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their children,188 often so much pressure that parents fear that
if they do not buy new clothes for their children, the children
will turn to selling drugs to make money to buy the clothes on
their own. 189 Clothes can even make a difference in how teach-
ers treat children, and accordingly, how they perform in school.
As one parent who had grown up poor in Appalachia observed,
"If a child is well dressed and is a little blond princess, she is
going to be treated different by the other kids, and sometimes
by the teachers, than a very poorly dressed child." 190 Harvard
need whatever goods and services are considered 'normal' in their community.
In making this point one teacher recalled, q remember my first John Romain
pocketbook. It was Christmas and, oh, I just cried. Then I fit in with every-
body else.'"); Michael Janofsky, Kool-Aid, Not Soda: Living on Food Stamps,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1995, at Al, A16 (quoting low-wage worker who accepts
food stamps, saying Tm embarrassed by this for the children. When I didn't
have the right clothes in school, they'd call me Rag Doll."); cf MICHAEL TONRY,
MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 16 (1995)
("Anyone who has struggled to provide for a child or who has been unable to
pay for a child's eyeglasses or school trip or videogames or whatever clothes
'everyone else' is wearing can empathize with a mother who, month after
month, can do few or none of those things.").
188. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 150 ('The kids give me a headache
about clothes."); id. at 26 ("Mlothers reported that their older children-
especially high school boys-felt they could not maintain their self-respect or
the respect of their peers while wearing K-Mart shoes to school.").
189. See id. at 26, reporting that
[s]ome mothers felt that if they did not purchase name-brand sneak-
ers, an athletic jacket, or other popular items for their teenagers,
their children might be lured into criminal activity so they could buy
these items themselves: "My boy, he sees these kids that sell drugs.
They can afford to buy these [tennis shoes] and he can't. So I have
my little side-job and [I buy them for him]. You got to do it to keep
them away from drugs, from the streets."
Id.; see also JULIET B. SCHOR, THE OVERSPENT AMERICAN 39-40 (1998) (citing
CARL HUSEMOLLER NIGHTINGALE, ON THE EDGE: A HISTORY OF POOR BLACK
CHILDREN AND THEIR AMERICAN DREAMS (1993)) (describing a study of inner-
city children in Philadelphia who end up selling drugs so that they can buy the
$100 athletic shoes, Nike sweats, or gold jewelry necessary to be respected so-
cially).
190. DUNCAN, supra note 66, at 41. See also id. at 51, quoting a thirty-six-
year-old man recalling,
When I hit seventh grade, where they kept changing classes and I
was in a different school, people were making fun of me because I
would have to bring my own lunch to school, wear shoes with holes in
them, whatever. That's when my grades went downhill. [I began to
fight with others in high school, and the principal gave me a choice.]
They said, 'We can expel you for the rest of the year or give you fifty
licks.' I took the expel ....
Id.; POLAKOW, supra note 171, at 138-41 (describing the life of a seven-year-
old girl who comes to school in "flipflops three sizes too big for her... in the
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lecturer Juliet Schor has described expenditures on children's
clothing as "defensive" spending, because it prevents children
from being ignored or treated badly at school. 191
Having the right clothes matters to adults, too. Part of the
reason is the fundamental self-expressive value of clothing, but
there is also a more practical reason: The better you look, the
more seriously you are taken in the job market. As the director
of programs for Dress for Success, a New York-based organiza-
tion that provides name-brand work outfits to low-income
women, explains, "we don't want to give people a chance to
think these women are anything less than anyone else."192
Dress for Success actually rejects many of the donations it gets,
passing them along to Salvation Army if they do not meet its
high standards. 193
There has been some recognition among policymakers that
new clothing is a worthwhile purchase. For example, both for-
mer President Clinton and former Senator Bill Bradley, when
singing the praises of the EITC, have specifically mentioned
new clothes for kids as an important use of the credit. 194 Oth-
ers, however, sharply criticize the clothing expenditures of
lower-income families. The disapproval has been particularly
targeted at the purchase of name-brand sneakers, which many
view as a waste of money, 195 despite the fact that they are one
of the most important clothing items in the eyes of many chil-
dren. 196 It takes a transformative experience, one of truly put-
ting oneself in another's shoes, to realize the value of these
seemingly "nonnecessary" items. Lynda McDonnell, a newspa-
per reporter who taught a college seminar to a group of fairly
middle of a snowy December--dressed in a summer blouse several sizes too
small and a long flimsy skirt," and how badly she is treated by her teacher and
her classmates).
191. See SCHOR, supra note 189, at 19.
192. Berg, supra note 39, at G2; cf. ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 4
(1999) (noting that "recent changes in the spending environment... affect...
the kind of suit you'll choose to wear to a job interview").
193. See Berg, supra note 39, at G2.
194. See FRANK, supra note 192, at 257 (citing Mary H. Cooper, The Work-
ing Poor: Will Funding Cuts Make Their Future Grimmer?, CON. Q.
RESEARCHER, Nov. 3, 1995, at 969); Romich & Weisner, supra note 14, at
1245.
195. See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 116, at 47 (suggesting that money spent
on "fancy gym shoes" does not benefit children).
196. See, e.g., ZUCCHINO, supra note 37, at 313 (reporting that one grand-
mother on welfare had been asked by her grandson for "a certain expensive
brand of sneakers" for Christmas); see also supra note 189.
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privileged freshmen in which she required them to intern at
agencies that serve poor people, described one such experience:
[One] student, working at a Minneapolis soup kitchen, noted that the
children wore clothes that would have been fashionable a decade ear-
lier-Smurfs sweat pants, Little Mermaid t-shirts. Recalling how the
kids who wore outdated clothes were taunted in her junior high, she
was suddenly ashamed of her designer clothes and tried to fold her
jacket and tug on her jeans to hide the labels.
In that moment, she understood clearly the difference between
merely being clothed and being clothed in a way that enables you to
fit in. She saw firsthand how even good intentions can have unex-
pected consequences when you don't know the recipients of your char-
ity; those Smurf sweats were likely donated by middle-class folks who
thought the Salvation Army was a better place for their cast-offs than
the closets of their nieces or nephews.
197
Part of the reason why people may underestimate the
value of new clothes to a lower-income family is that they forget
that the concept of what clothes are "needed" does not come
from nowhere; higher-income people help set the standard.
Any time a need is identified, there has to be some baseline es-
tablished. Poverty is always a relative measure. Food, for ex-
ample, can be enough to keep a person alive, enough to keep
him well nourished, or a several course meal at a five-star res-
taurant. Shelter can be anything from a cardboard box to a
mansion. Medical care can be a Band-Aid or major surgery.
And clothing, of course, can be cast-off Smurf sweatpants or
brand-new Air Jordans. As Juliet Schor has observed, "Indeed,
the very term 'standard of living' suggests the point: the stan-
dard is a social norm:"198
The concept that poverty is relative is not a new one.
Adam Smith argued over two hundred years ago that the "ne-
cessaries" of life include "whatever the custom of the country
renders it indecent for creditable people, even of the lowest or-
der, to be without."199 As an example, Smith observed that
while in eighteenth-century England, "The poorest creditable
person of eithet sex would be ashamed to appear in public
without [leather shoes]," the same was not true in France,
where "the lowest rank of both sexes appear ... publicly, with-
out any discredit, sometimes in wooden shoes, and sometimes
197. Lynda McDonnell, The Ghost of Tom Joad: What Happens When an
Entire Generation Forgets What It Means to Be Poor?, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov.
2000, at 13.
198. SCHOR, supra note 189, at 9.
199. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 821 (Edwin Cannan ed., Modem Library 1937).
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bare-footed."2°° More recently, economist and Nobel laureate
Amartya Sen has argued,
Relative deprivation in terms of incomes can yield absolute depriva-
tion in terms of capabilities. Being relatively poor in a rich country
can be a great capability handicap, even when one's absolute income
is high in world standards. In a generally opulent country, more in-
come is needed to buy enough commodities to achieve the same social
functioning."20 1
Sen goes on to suggest that goods like televisions, VCRs,
and cars are often necessary to "take part in the life of a com-
munity" in a country where almost everyone has these things.
The "strain on a relatively poor person in a rich country" to
meet "the competing demands of these expenses" and seem-
ingly more fundamental needs, like food, is part of the reason
why there is still hunger in wealthy countries like the United
States.20 2 Recall the woman quoted above who skips meals but
spends money on the soda, cigarettes, and makeup she needs to
make her feel human.20 3 Sociologists Richard Sennett and
Jonathan Cobb have described this as the problem of a "post-
scarcity society," where "[fireedom is no longer simply the free-
dom to eat."2°4 Many others have noted the relative, or com-
petitive nature of spending and human needs,20 5 although the
200. Id. at 822.
201. JAMES FOSTER & AMARTYA SEN, ON EcoNoMIc INEQUALITY 212-13
(2d ed. 1997) (citations omitted).
202. See id. at 213 n.160.
203. See supra text accompanying note 183.
204. RICHARD SENNETT & JONATHAN COBB, THE HIDDEN INJURIES OF
CLASS 74 (1972).
205. See ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 14, at 141 ("The kinds of cloth-
ing, food, transportation, and shelter that lead to endless and profound embar-
rassment in one society might be perfectly compatible with a dignified, if spar-
tan, existence in another. This line cannot be drawn technocratically.").
Poor Americans are poor relative to other Americans. But this does
not mean that they are "not really" poor. Human beings are social
creatures who live in interaction and in comparison with others. A
person deprived of things that everyone around him has is likely to
suffer a sense of inadequacy, a loss of dignity and self-respect. Thus
poverty is partly a state of mind, based on one's relative standing in
one's own society and community.
PAGE & SIMMONS, supra note 17, at 26.
When through the process of economic expansion new symbols of com-
fort among the well-to-do replace old ones-two cars instead of one, a
speedboat, a personal set of encyclopedias for his kids-[a factory
worker interviewed by the authors] is hard-put to resist the admoni-
tions to buy, because all these objects may be necessary for someone
to live a 'really' respectable life, and he isn't at that point yet.
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concept is not without its critics, who claim that concern about
relative status in society is "predominantly an upper class" no-
tion, and "unimportant" to lower-income people.2°6
This problem also appears to be getting worse, as income
and wealth inequality in the United States continues to
grow,207 while technology brings us closer and closer together.
Schor's theory is that people are no longer just "keeping up
with the Joneses"; now television sets the standard, and people
are trying to mimic the lifestyles of the characters on Friends
or the drivers of the Mercedes Benzes they on TV.20 8 As evi-
dence of the perceived need to keep up with the spending of the
rich, social scientists cite the growing problem of middle-class
consumer debt.20 9 Polling data also suggest that relative income
is what drives feelings of economic inadequacy, more than abso-
lute income. Asked if they would prefer "World A: You earn
$110,000 per year, others earn $200,000" or "World B: You earn
$100,000 per year, others earn $85,000," most Americans
choose World B.2 10
SENNETT & COBB, supra note 204. THUROW, supra note 13, at 99 ("[W]ants
are generated by societal pressures. There are no innate wants (other than
the biological ones)...."); Kelman, supra note 169, at 61 ("[S]tandards of what
constitutes degradation will vary across cultures, time, and economic circum-
stances. Circumstances of life that might not seem degrading in an Indian vil-
lage might well be regarded as such in the contemporary United States. Such
judgments are relative.").
206. Gordon Tullock notes,
It is sometimes said that people are not interested particularly in
their actual income but in their comparative income.... I regard
[this] as basically an absurd proposition.... [This kind of feeling is
predominantly an upper class one. We don't worry about starving,
but we want to be respected by our acquaintances. This requires that
our consumption be at least up to community standards. If we were
really poor, such matters would be less important.
Gordon Tullock, The Reality of Redistribution, in POvERTY AND INEQUALITY:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REDISTRIBUTION 127, 134 (Jon Neill ed., 1997).
207. See JARED BERNSTEIN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLY PRIORITIES
& ECON. POLY INST., PULLING APART: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF
INCOME TRENDS, at x, httpJ/www.cbpp.org1-18-00sfp-partl.pdf. (Jan. 18,
2000) (reporting that in two-thirds of the states, the income gap between the
top and bottom fifths of families grew from the late 1980s to the late 1990s).
208. SCHOR, supra note 189, at 4, 10.
209. FRANK, supra note 192, at 4-5; SCHOR, supra note 189, at 19-20; Nina
Bernstein, Widest Income Gap Is Found in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
2000, at B5 (quoting NYU economist Ed Wolff, saying, "The middle class is go-
ing deeper and deeper into debt. They've been mortgaging their homes up to
the hilt to try to keep up with the Wall Street Joneses.").
210. See Robert H. Frank, Why Living in a Rich Society Makes Us Feel
Poor, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 15, 2000, at 62.
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The scramble to spend is not just a middle-class problem;
lower-income families see the same television ads and pro-
grams and live in the same world, however far apart their lives
might seem from those at the top of the economic ladder.211 As
a result, policies that deprive lower-income families of the abil-
ity to make the same kinds of spending decisions as everyone
else-including the decision to purchase perceived "luxuries"
instead of goods that others assume to be the basic necessities
of life--end up isolating them socially. This is what happens
every time a family wishes to buy a "luxury" but is forced to
buy a "necessity" because all the family has is a voucher or in-
kind aid. Cash transfers, by contrast, allow families to make
whichever spending choices best meet their needs, maximizing
society's return on its investment in public assistance.
C. THE VARIABILITY OF PREFERENCES
As suggested in the previous section, there is a great deal
of variability among the preferences of lower-income people for
various goods and services. This is true even when it comes to
those "basic necessities" that are currently provided through
restricted transfers or in-kind aid, such as food and housing.
Part of the reason is that needs can vary according to any of a
number of demographic characteristics, including how many
adults and children there are in a family, and of what ages;
what region of the country the family lives in; whether the fam-
ily lives in a city or a suburb; where family members work;
what type of housing the family lives in; what transportation
options are available; and what time of year it is. Restricted
transfers and in-kind aid can, and often do, adjust for some of
these variables, although often at substantial administrative
cost. Not all of these variables can be precisely accounted for,
however. As Linda Alwitt and Thomas Donley noted in their
study of low-income consumers, there are complex interactions
among various demographic characteristics. For example,
Because of the pressures of raising a child without a partner, single
parents might place a high value on convenience in meeting their
consumer needs. For example, transporting the children to the store
is difficult even if a car is available, but using public transit to trans-
port both children and purchases becomes quite formidable and near
211. See FRANK, supra note 192, at 3 ("[Ihe spending of the superrich...
[has] been the leading edge of pervasive changes in the spending patterns of
middle- and even low-income families.").
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impossible.21
2
Does this mean that food subsidies should be increased for
single parents, and especially those without cars, in order to
take into account the fact that they will be more likely to shop
in local neighborhood stores, where prices are typically
higher?213 It would be nearly impossible to make those kinds of
detailed judgments, and certainly prohibitively costly to do so.
Graetz and Mashaw propose to address the variability of hous-
ing and child care costs, at least, by subsidizing a set percent-
age of expenditures. 214 But while their scheme would accom-
plish some of the same goals as cash transfers, it would be
much more difficult than cash to administer, because it would
require much greater interaction between the agency providing
the subsidy and the beneficiary making the purchase.
People,s tastes and preferences also vary even beyond the
bounds of what their demographic characteristics would pre-
dict. Usually, we celebrate this aspect of human nature. It
would be a dull world if we all had exactly the same desires-
for the same food, the same kinds of housing, the same clothes.
But some of us have big appetites and care little about how
many rooms our apartments have; others love to dress up and
would eat macaroni and cheese from a box every day if that
were what it took to stay looking good. The permutations are
virtually endless.
This is not merely an intuition about human nature; it is
also supported by empirical data. Studies of the effects of cash-
ing out food stamps, for example, show that a significant per-
centage of people would spend some of the money on something
other than food. Estimates from nationwide consumption sur-
veys suggest that 10-15% of people would choose to spend some
of the money on other items.215 Studies of actual cash-out dem-
onstration projects, conducted in Alabama, San Diego County,
and Washington State in the early 1990s, found an overall
reduction in food expenditures of 18-28%.216 The fact that food
stamps have a street value far below their face value may also
212. ALWITT & DONLEY, supra note 173, at 58.
213. See id. at 127 (citing studies that show food prices in poor neighbor-
hoods are higher than in other neighborhoods).
214. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 126, at 247-50.
215. See Thomas M. Fraker et al., The Effects of Cashing-Out Food Stamps
on Household Food Use and the Cost of Issuing Benefits, 14 J. POLVY. ANALYSIS
& MGMrr. 372, 376 (1995).
216. See Fraker et al., supra note 99, at 645.
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reinforce this finding, although some of the reduction in value
is surely attributable to compensation to the buyer for engaging
in this illegal trade.217 How the money is spent varies. There
is some evidence that when a family dips into the food budget,
whether legally or illegally, the money is typically redirected to
rent and transportation,218 although occasionally it may be
spent on other items, such as school supplies 2 9 or illegal
drugs.220 Setting aside the issue of illegal drugs for the mo-
ment,221 it is clear that some families currently receiving re-
stricted transfers are prevented from obtaining the precise mix
of goods and services that best suits their needs.
Another kind of economic choice that restricted transfers
and in-kind benefits generally do not permit is the decision to
save for the future. You cannot put your food stamps or your
Section 8 voucher in the bank for a rainy day. The exception to
this is Individual Development Accounts, but these only allow
saving for very limited purchases. 222 Cash is a much more ef-
fective vehicle for saving, as many EITC recipients have dis-
covered. The annual EITC refund, researchers have recently
learned, is often used to save for future expenses or invest in
assets that promote economic mobility, such as a car, schooling,
or housing in a better neighborhood. 223 Middle-class taxpayers
often save or invest their tax refund as well.224 As Philippe Van
217. See infra text accompanying note 233.
218. See BARBARA COHEN & NATHAN YOUNG, URBAN INST., EVALUATION
OF THE WASHINGTON STATE FOOD STAMP CASHOUT DEMONSTRATION 77 (1993)
(showing that cashing out food stamps leads to higher expenditures on shelter
and transportation); EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 220 ('Typically, mothers
traded food stamps for cash only when they were short on the rent....");
Richard Rothstein, Inner-City Nomads Follow a Track to Low Grades, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2000, at B9 ("Forced to spend more [than thirty percent of in-
come on rent, due to the lack of affordable housing], poor families often raid
food budgets to pay rent.").
219. See ZUCCHINO, supra note 37, at 151.
220. Id. at 81.
221. For a discussion of spending on illegal drugs, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 292-300.
222. 42 U.S.C. § 604(h) (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
223. Smeeding et al., supra note 14, at 1198; see Romich & Weisner, supra
note 14, at 1259.
224. See FAST FINANCIAL ANALYSIS, GALLUP SURVEY ASKS AMERICANS
ABOUT TAX REFUNDS, at http'J/www.fastfa.com/tax/articles/survey.asp (last
visited March 29, 2002) (reporting on a 1999 Gallup poll, which found that
thirty-six percent of taxpayers who received a refund used all or part of the
money to add to their savings, and twelve percent invest all or some of the
money).
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Parijs has argued, part of the purpose of public assistance
should be to help give people
the real freedom to acquire and use means of production. And this it
can do, in part, precisely because it is given in cash rather than in the
form of non-tradable food vouchers or housing grants, for example,
and because therefore any part of it that exceeds the barest current
needs can be used to build up productive wealth by those keen enough
to do so.22
5
The preference for postponing current consumption in fa-
vor of an improved economic future is fundamentally no differ-
ent than a preference for housing over food, or clothes over
housing. These are choices that lower-income people would like
to make, in order to best meet their own needs. Only through
cash transfers can we be sure that those preferences will be
satisfied.
D. LIMITATIONS AND PRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS
There are a few important limitations to the argument for
the cost-effectiveness of cash-based public assistance that must
be acknowledged. First, while most public assistance should be
cash-based, health care programs should generally remain in-
kind. The main reason for this is that health care is a "merit
good," which is "something that in our ethical judgment every-
body should have, whether or not they are willing or able to buy
it."226 One might think from this description that food and
housing are also merit goods, and surely many do see them that
way. But the reality is that in the United States today, a res-
taurant may refuse to feed a starving person and a shelter may
refuse to house a homeless person, but a hospital may not re-
fuse to provide emergency medical services to a person who
cannot afford them.227 If we view health care as something that
must be provided to everyone, then we should do so in the most
cost-effective way, which is through group insurance. Insur-
ance programs are more cost-effective in part because they en-
courage the use of preventative services. For example, by pro-
viding routine doctor visits for small children, programs like
Medicaid and CHIP prevent costly trips to the emergency
room.228 In-kind provision of group health insurance, as op-
225. VAN PARIJS, supra note 17, at 42.
226. BERGMANN, supra note 131, at 131.
227. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395dd (Law. Co-op. Supp. 2000).
228. See AM. COLL. OF PHYSICIANS, No HEALTH INSURANCE? IT's ENOUGH
TO MAKE You SIcK--ScIENTIFIc RESEARCH LINKING THE LACK OF HEALTH
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posed to a restricted transfer for the individual purchase of
health insurance, is also warranted because robust markets for
individual insurance policies do not currently exist.229 A lower-
income person would therefore have difficulty purchasing an
insurance policy equivalent to Medicaid or CHIP coverage on
the private market. In other words, health insurance may be
one of those rare goods for which government is a more effec-
tive market participant than the individual consumer.230
Second, cashing out programs will not always make much
practical difference in the purchases that people are able to
make. There are two reasons for this. The first is that money is
fungible. If you give someone the resources to obtain one thing,
often it just frees up funds to buy something else. To give a
simple example, imagine a child who has a dollar bill to spend
each day for a snack, and uses it to buy a small carton of milk.
You think to yourself, "This is great, I want to help this kid buy
his milk," so you give him a coupon for a free carton of milk
each day. Now the child has a coupon and a dollar bill, so he
gets a carton of milk and a candy bar each day. Like it or not,
you bought him the candy bar.
This is what happens any time the government or a private
charity gives a person a voucher or in-kind aid targeted at a
purchase the person was already making; all the voucher or in-
kind aid does is free up funds for another, possibly entirely dif-
COVERAGE TO POOR HEALTH 16 (Nov. 30, 1999), http//www.acponline.org/
uninsured/lack-paper.pdf.
229. See IRIS J. LAV & JOEL FRIEDMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLy
PRIORITIES, TAX CREDITS FOR INDIVIDUALS TO BuY HEALTH INSURANCE WON'T
HELP MANY UNINSURED FAMILIES 6-7, http://www.cbpp.org/2-15-Oltax2.pdf.
(Feb. 15, 2001).
230. While a full cash-out of health care services would be unwise, a shift
toward more consumer-directed spending can be accomplished by transform-
ing some purely in-kind aid into a more flexible restricted transfer. The U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services and the Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation are currently funding a demonstration project called Cash and
Counseling, which creates a restricted cash benefit that allows elderly or dis-
abled Medicaid recipients who require personal assistance services (such as
help with dressing, bathing, and eating) to determine whom to hire and for
what services, in accordance with their individual needs. Participants can
also decide to use this cash benefit to purchase other goods or services that
enhance their ability to live independently, such as transportation, home
modifications, or assistive devices. See KEVIN J. MAHONEY & LORI SIMON-
RuSINOwITz, UNIV. OF MD. CTR. ON AGING, CASH AND COUNSELING:
DEMONSTRATION AND EVALUATION OF A CONSUMER-DIRECTED MODEL FOR
LONG-TERM SERVICES, at http:/www.inform.umd.edu/EdRes/Colleges/HLHP/
AGING/CCDemo/overview.html (last updated Aug. 2, 2000).
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ferent, purchase. This is particularly likely when aid levels are
set very low, and when they are targeted at the kinds of basic
necessities that people almost always choose to buy for them-
selves. For example, imagine a family that currently spends
$200 on food. Giving $250 in food stamps each month to this
family will generally induce a $50 increase in the amount of
food purchased. This is because the family has no choice but to
spend that extra $50 on food; the only other choice is to leave it
unspent (assuming the family does not sell or trade the stamps
on the black market).231 On the other hand, providing the same
family with less than $200 in food stamps or a cash grant of
any size would not necessarily change the size of the family's
food budget, because the family was already choosing to spend
more than that amount on food. In order for a restricted trans-
fer to change the recipient's behavior in some way, therefore, it
must either be so large that it forces the recipient to buy more
of the good than she otherwise would have or it must be for a
good that she would not otherwise have chosen to buy. Other-
wise, the restricted transfer may as well have come in cash; the
only difference is that restricted transfers are more damaging
to the recipient's dignity, as will be discussed in Part III, below.
The second reason why cash-outs may not make much
practical difference is that restricted transfers often end up
functioning as cash assistance anyway, because illegal markets
crop up to convert the restricted transfers to cash or other
goods. These kinds of exchanges have been going on in the
United States since at least the nineteenth century.232 In re-
cent years, they have been particularly common with paper
food stamps. Through "stamp men" who often work the street
corners near welfare offices, food stamps can be sold for fifty to
seventy cents per dollar's worth of face value.233 Some store-
owners also exchange food stamps for nonfood items or cash,
typically paying fifty cents on the dollar.234 The discount is
presumably compensation for the risk that storeowners or
"stamp men" take in engaging in this illegal activity. Food
stamps are also sometimes traded for such services as car rides
231. See infra notes 232-36.
232. See ZELIZER, supra note 37, at 134-35, 173, 187-88.
233. ZucCHINo, supra note 37, at 81.
234. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FOOD ASSISTANCE:
REDUCING THE TRAFFICKING OF FOOD STAMP BENEFITS 1 (GAOIT-RCED-00-
250, July 19, 2000) (Statement of Lawrence J. Dyckman before the Task Force
on Welfare, Committee on the Budget, House of Representatives).
2002]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
home from the grocery store235 or illegal drugs.236 In addition,
the food bought with food stamps can be used to generate in-
come. Sometimes the food is resold as-is;237 other times, enter-
prising people prepare hot meals with the food and sell the
meals door-to-door, at a considerable profit.238 Using Electronic
Benefit Transfers instead of paper stamps can curb some of
these exchanges, but the resale of food is virtually impossible to
stop.
E. ADMINISTRATIVE SAVINGS
Converting public assistance to a purely cash-based system
would also result in substantial administrative savings. These
savings accrue not only to the government or charity adminis-
tering the assistance, but also to the individual recipient. The
state or a private charity saves money by cashing out public as-
sistance because there is much less work involved, both in
terms of paperwork and actual numbers of people needed to
administer the aid. Establishing and maintaining a voucher
system involves a lot more paperwork and staff work than sim-
ply handing over cash. The same is true of in-kind aid. Run-
ning a food pantry or soup kitchen, for example, requires much
more labor and work space than giving out money does. Of
course, a great deal of the administrative costs of many pro-
grams comes from verifying eligibility and the amount of aid
that will be given out, and these costs will exist regardless of
whether or not the aid is in cash. This has been a particular
problem with the food stamp program, where federal concerns
about fraud and over-payment have fueled the creation of ex-
tensive state bureaucracies.239 But the act of cashing out a
program like food stamps does itself help reduce administrative
costs. The cash-out demonstration project in San Diego
County, for example, reduced monthly administrative costs by
$2.02 per recipient, for a total monthly savings of $111,350, or
$1.3 million per year. 240
The other type of "administrative" savings from cashing
out public assistance comes from the time and energy it saves
235. ZUCMNO, supra note 37, at 314.
236. Id. at 81.
237. ZELIZER, supra note 37, at 197.
238. ZUCCHINO, supra note 37, at 117-18.
239. See Elizabeth Becker, Millions Eligible For Food Stamps Aren't Apply-
ing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2001, at Al.
240. See Fraker et al., supra note 215, at 386 tbl.3, 387.
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for the recipients. Under the current hodgepodge of a system,
people often end up devoting considerable amounts of time to
rounding up the resources to meet the various needs in their
lives. Laura Lein reports from a study of Mexican-American
families in a San Antonio public housing project that
[iun order to get the goods and services their families needed each
month, the San Antonio families garnered assistance from as many as
twenty-five different public and private service agencies each year.
Each agency had different regulatory requirements, eligibility crite-
ria, and routines for service delivery. Thus, using agencies as a sur-
vival strategy took a lot of time, energy, and know-how.
24 1
Part of the problem is that there are so many different pub-
lic and private agencies administering the aid. Cashing out the
programs will not necessarily change that aspect of the system,
although it will surely lead to some consolidation in the long
run. After all, what is the point of having a separate housing
agency, energy assistance program, and food stamp office if
they all just distribute cash? Some states have tried to make
things a little easier for recipients of public assistance by creat-
ing a single application for multiple types of assistance.242 But
there is no question that the process would be easier if every-
one were just giving out cash. Cash distributions also reduce
the time devoted to keeping extensive records of rent and util-
ity payments, for example, as those receiving certain restricted
transfers currently must do.243
Furthermore, it is possible that the administrative costs to
recipients associated with non-cash programs may be operating
as a disincentive to participation. More than eighty-five per-
cent of those eligible for the federal EITC claim it,24 while less
than sixty percent of those eligible for food stamps are enrolled
in the program.245 While there are surely other factors at
241. EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 10.
242. See, e.g., VERMONT AGENCY OF HUMAN SERVICES, COMMON
APPLICATION, at http'//www.ahs.state.vt.us/CommonApp (last visited March
29, 2002).
243. See EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 148 (describing the careful record-
keeping required of women on public assistance, including the need to keep
track of rent and utility bills).
244. See ROBERT CHERRY & MAX SAWICKY, ECON. POLY INST., GIVING TAX
CREDIT WHERE CREDIT Is DUE: A "UNIVERSAL UNIFIED CHILD CREDIT" THAT
EXPANDS THE EITC AND CUTS TAXES FOR WORKING FAMIES 3, http://
www.epinet.org/briefingpapers/EITC%20BP.pdf. (Apr. 2000).
245. See Becker, supra note 239, at Al (reporting that seventeen million
people are enrolled in the food stamp program, while another twelve million
are eligible but not enrolled).
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work-including the stigma associated with food stamps, a lack
of knowledge that one is eligible, and the bureaucratic hassles
involved in claiming food stamps-part of the reason the EITC
is used more often may be that it involves a simple cash trans-
fer.
III. THE HUMAN DIGNITY ARGUMENT FOR CASH
TRANSFERS
There is ample evidence in welfare history that the money payment
made directly to the needy individual preserves his sense of dignity
and pride ....
- United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
January, 1969246
Cash transfers are not only the most cost-effective form of
public assistance; they are also the best way to avoid injury to
the individual recipient's dignity. Even those who argue for re-
stricted transfers or in-kind aid generally concede that cash
transfers are more in keeping with our conception of what it
means to be an equal citizen in a free society. As Steven Kel-
man has noted,
Cash transfers .... respect the right to liberty by giving beneficiaries
greater choice about how to use the benefits provided them. If one
values human beings, one values the features that constitute them.
In particular, one values those features special to people, such as the
ability to choose, an ability that is unique and miraculous. These ar-
guments create a presumption in favor of cash transfers .... 247
Advocates of cash transfers appeal to this political ideal.
In introducing their proposal for an $80,000 cash grant to each
American, Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott explain, "Our vi-
sion of economic citizenship is rooted in the classical liberal
tradition. It is up to each citizen-not the government-to de-
cide how she will use her fair share of the nation's patri-
mony."248
These are more than abstract ideals. Social science re-
search suggests that the amount of consumer choice a person
has directly impacts how powerful he feels and how able he is
to develop a strong personal identity. Psychological studies
246. Roberts v. Harder, 320 F. Supp. 1313, 1315 (D. Conn. 1970), affd, 440
F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1971), vacated and rev'd on other grounds, 405 U.S. 1037
(1972) (citing U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Report to
House Ways and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee).
247. Kelman, supra note 169, at 65.
248. ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 14, at 3.
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have found that the less control a person has over his life, as
measured in part by the opportunities he has to make choices,
the less powerful he will feel.249 That feeling of powerlessness
is not good for the individual, nor is it good for a society in
which the legitimacy of decisionmaking depends on equal par-
ticipation. The ability to make consumer choices is also linked
to the formation of personal identity. As anthropologist and
consumer studies expert Grant McCracken has observed, "One
of the ways individuals satisfy the freedom and fulfill [the] re-
sponsibility of self-definition is through the systematic appro-
priation of the meaningful properties of goods."2 50 McCracken
describes three common ways in which we transfer meaning
from consumer goods to ourselves: exchange rituals (in which
gifts are used to express something about the personal identi-
ties of the giver and the receiver); possession rituals (such as
"personalizing" one's home by displaying certain belongings);
and grooming rituals (where clothes, hair products, and even
cars are used to help create one's identity).251 The implication is
that, without the opportunity to make these spending choices
for oneself, a person will find it more difficult to develop a
strong sense of personal identity.
Social stigma is another major source of harm to the dig-
nity of the public assistance recipient. Any time a person re-
veals herself to others as the recipient of public assistance, she
is at risk of being looked down upon or demeaned by others.
Cash transfers carry no stigma because all dollar bills look
alike, but stigma problems routinely occur when a public assis-
tance recipient is forced to seek in-kind aid or use a coupon-
style voucher in a very public place. Stories about the stigma of
using paper food stamps in the grocery store, for example, are
legion. Here are just a few.
You really do have to be a strong person to be able to use Food
Stamps and not get intimidated by how people treat you when you
249. See ALWITr & DONLEY, supra note 173, at 67 (reporting the findings of
numerous psychological studies on this point).
250. Grant McCracken, Culture and Consumption: A Theoretical Account of
the Structure and Movement of the Cultural Meaning of Consumer Goods, 13 J.
CONSUMER RES. 71, 80 (1986); see also SENNETr & COBB, supra note 204, at
258 ("[Material things are aids to creating an inner self which is complex,
variegated, not easily fathomed by others .... ."); ZELIZER, supra note 37, at
212 ("[P]eople employ goods simultaneously as markers of their social rank, as
indicators of other shared collective identities, and as signals of their indi-
viduality.-).
25L See McCracken, supra note 250, at 78-80.
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use them. And even then it's still hard. You feel people's vibes, you
know, in the 1i 2i. And the checkout people are almost without excep-
tion rude ....
It's absolutely blatant in the stores. They'll smile and be chatting
with you, and then they see you pull out the Food Stamps-they just
freeze up. And they scrutinize the food.
253
[W]hen you go to the supermarket I get that different treatment
when I pull out the food stamps and people look at you and say you're
on ADC and you're not trying to better yourself-and then I feel bad,
I want to cry[,] I want to tell them don't look like that-you don't
know what's going on in our life!
254
While the stigma effect of using food stamps has been
somewhat alleviated by the now nearly completed shift from
paper stamps to Electronic Benefit Transfers (EBTs),255 EBTs
still present some stigma problems, because an EBT card, like
paper food stamps, may reveal its holder to be a recipient of
public assistance. Nor is stigma a problem confined to food
stamps. People report similar experiences with Medicaid
cards,256 school lunch programs,257 and subsidized housing.2 8
Among housing programs, living in public housing probably
presents the greatest stigma problems, as anyone who has
grown up in "the projects" can attest. After all, it is difficult to
keep people from knowing where you live. Housing vouchers
can also be a source of stigma since at a minimum, public assis-
tance recipients must inform prospective landlords that they
have vouchers.
Stigma is particularly difficult for children, both because
their egos tend to be somewhat fragile and because children are
252. MARK ROBERT RANK, LIVING ON THE EDGE: THE REALITIES OF
WELFARE IN AMERICA 137 (1994) (quoting a food stamp recipient).
253. Id. at 138 (quoting a food stamp recipient).
254. POLAKOW, supra note 171, at 69 (quoting a food stamp recipient).
255. See 7 U.S.C. § 2016(i) (2000), amended by Act of Feb. 11, 2000, 7
U.S.C.S. § 2016 (Law Co-op. Supp. 2000) (noting that food stamps will be con-
verted from paper form to EBTs by 2002).
256. See RANK, supra note 252, at 139.
257. See id. at 139-40; REBECCA BLANK, IT TAKES A NATION: A NEW
AGENDA FOR FIGHTING POVERTY 106 (1997) (explaining how children who take
advantage of the school lunch programs are "clearly visible as public aid re-
cipient"); Carey Goldberg, Working Hard, Doing Well, Less Than Excited
About Bush's Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at 16 (reporting on a conver-
sation with a woman who "remembers the shame.., of having a pink lunch
ticket, showing that her lunch, unlike most of the other children's, was subsi-
dized because her family was poor.... 'Why should any child have to go
through that?' she asked.").
258. See BLANK, supra note 257, at 106.
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generally quick to identify differences and use them as a reason
to tease or taunt others. 259 Yet those who advocate restricted
transfers often rationalize that choice by citing a concern about
protecting children.260
Harm to dignity also appears in forms not directly related
to stigma or more general psychological effects. Harm may
come at the hands of the government official or charity worker
administering the aid. As one woman described it, "It's a fight
to keep your self-esteem up.... You go to your social worker
and they treat you like nothing."261 This problem could theo-
retically be solved with a change in attitude of the people in-
volved in administering the aid, but changing the mindset in a
bureaucracy is notoriously difficult. Admittedly, this is a prob-
lem that persists even with cash transfers, since any means-
tested program will necessarily require some interaction with
some bureaucracy. But if multiple programs were streamlined
and consolidated into a single cash transfer, the amount of in-
teraction required with people administering the aid would
likely be reduced.
Another dignity harm associated with restricted transfers
and in-kind aid comes from the limits they place on the recipi-
ent's ability to wield economic power. The best example of this
is in the rental housing setting. In many states, if a landlord
does not comply with legal requirements to keep the apartment
in a certain condition, the tenant has the right to withhold
rent.262 If the tenant relies on a third party, such as the gov-
ernment, to pay all or part of the rent, she cannot threaten to
withhold payment as a means of forcing her landlord to comply
with the law. While the third party may be able to do so on her'
behalf, the threat is not quite as powerful as if the tenant could
make it herself. "I won't pay rent until you get the heat work-
ing again" is a more dignified and credible threat than "I'm go-
259. See, e.g., supra text preceding note 1.
260. See infra note 323.
261. ALWITr & DONLEY, supra note 173, at 12 (1996) (quoting Joe David-
son, Welfare Mothers Stress Importance of Building Self-Esteem if Aid System
is to Be Restructured, WALL ST. J., May 12, 1995, at A14); see also EDIN &
LEIN, supra note 37, at 139 ("They treat you like an animal.. . ."); id. at 140
('They make you feel like dirt in the street."); POLAKOW, supra note 171, at 84
("I went up and they were so snotty-they made me feel really degraded being
in there-like I was asking for something I didn't deserve.").
262. See JESSE DUtKEiNIER & JAMES E. KIUER, PROPERTY 527 (4th ed.
1998) (explaining that a tenant may withhold rent as a remedy for a landlord's
breach of the implied warranty of habitability).
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ing to call the housing authority and ask them to stop paying
rent." Of course, it is conceivable that the landlord would feel
more threatened by a phone call from the local housing author-
ity if he had a number of Section 8 tenants and was concerned
about losing their payments as well. But that scenario requires
a highly responsive housing authority. The situation is even
worse with in-kind housing assistance. A tenant in public
housing is almost completely at the mercy of the housing au-
thority. Since the housing authority is also the landlord, the
only immediate loss it incurs from not keeping the apartment
in good shape is whatever small monthly payments the tenant
is required to make.
Finally, limiting parents' access to cash can deprive them
of the dignity of being able to provide things for their children.
Parents like to be able to buy nice things for their kids, and
worry that not being able to do so will affect how their children
perceive them. Parents also want to be able to pass along some
spending power to their children.263 More generally, as Juliet
Schor has noted, "In a culture where consuming means so
much, not having money is a profound social disability. For
parents, faced with the desires of their children, the failure can
feel overwhelming."264 The feeling is particularly overwhelm-
ing when the main resources available to parents to satisfy
their children's varying desires are vouchers and in-kind aid,
rather than cash.
The significance of the dignity value of cash transfers is
underscored by its recurrence as a theme in the evolution of
public assistance in America. In some ways, we have evolved a
great deal from the earliest days of our nation's history, when
people who received "poor relief' were required by law to wear
a "P" on their sleeves to identify themselves as paupers. 265
While throughout the nineteenth century, most relief came in
the form of in-kind aid or vouchers from the state and private
charities,266 there was a shift in thinking around the turn of the
twentieth century. Cash assistance became more common,
with the "old method' of orders for groceries or gifts of goods
[viewed] as 'undemocratic and harmful to the character of the
263. Researchers have found that one use of the EITC is to provide pocket
money for the children. See Romich & Weisner, supra note 14, at 1259.
264. SCHOR, supra note 189, at 39.
265. ZUCCINO, supra note 37, at 63 (describing the first General Poor Law
enacted in Pennsylvania).
266. See ZELIZER, supra note 37, at 120-21.
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recipient" by many private and public agencies. 267 Much of the
rhetoric about public assistance in the Progressive Era and the
1920s focused on dignity concerns. As Princeton sociologist
Viviana Zelizer recounts,
[FIreedom of consumption was declared by the noted consumer-
economist Hazel Kyrk to be "as well-established a principle as free-
dom of conscience." Even when it improved the quality of consump-
tion, any sort of authoritative regulation, therefore, violated the basic
right of "choosing the instruments of material life." Regulated con-
sumption, Kyrk explained, degraded individualized choice into a,
method "analogous to the feeding, clothing, and amusing of the chil-
dren of a household, of the soldiers of an army, or the inmates of a re-
formatory."
268
New Deal legislation continued this theme of choice and
dignity. As one observer noted on the occasion of the twentieth
anniversary of the Social Security Act, which created Social
Security and Aid to Dependent Children (later renamed Aid to
Families with Dependent Children),
[Tihe act affirmed the dignity and responsibility of recipients by
specifying that aid was to be given in the form of money, which the
receiver was free to spend as he or she deemed best, rather than as
aid in kind, such as orders for groceries or fuel, which too often re-
flected condescension and unwarranted suspicion in past relief ad-
ministration. 2
69
Spurred in part by claims that many AFDC recipients
mismanaged their money, restricted transfers and in-kind aid
soon reemerged as the dominant forms of assistance.270 Pro-
grams enacted in the 1960s as part of President Lyndon John-
son's "War on Poverty" tended to be restricted transfers or in-
kind aid, including housing and health care programs. Presi-
dent Nixon presided over an expansion of the Food Stamp pro-
gram,271 although he also advocated broad-based cash assis-
tance.272 Although dignity rhetoric was employed in the
welfare rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s,2 73 that
267. See id. at 145 (quoting REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION
ON RELIEF FOR WMOWED MOTHERS, 122-23 (1914)).
268. Id. at 148 (quoting HAZEL KYRK, A THEORY OF CONSUMPTION 40, 290
(1923)).
269. Wilbur J. Cohen, Social Security Objectives and Achievements, SOC.
SEC. BULL., Aug., 1955 at 2.
270. See ZELIZER, supra note 37, at 194-95.
271. See MOYNIHAN, supra note 144, at 121-22.
272. See supra text accompanying note 142.
273. See DAVIS, supra note 169, at 45 (reporting that one of the four stated
goals of the National Welfare Rights Organization in 1967 was "Dignity: A
system that guarantees recipients the full freedoms, rights, and respect as all
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movement ultimately failed to achieve its central goal of estab-
lishing substantive rights to public assistance.2 74 Dignity has
since resurfaced in the discussion of food stamp cash-outs. In
advocating cash-outs, states have cited not only the reduced
administrative costs, but also the desire to end the stigma asso-
ciated with food stamps.275
The theme of dignity also runs through the history of con-
straints on women's ability to make spending choices. Until
the early twentieth century, most middle- and upper-class
American women had no direct control of cash money and had
to seek their husbands' permission for purchases they wished
to make.2 76 Many women resisted this, often using similar
techniques to those public assistance recipients use today to get
cash out of a more constraining system. For example, women
would ask merchants to overcharge them for an approved pur-
chase, and give them the difference in cash.2 77 The women's
movement fought for a change in this system, decrying the in-
dignity of a woman having no money to spend as she wished.
As the Ladies' Home Journal stated in 1925, "There is no lib-
erty without some money that belongs to us and not to a
budget. 2 78 Charles Zueblin, a sociologist of the time, similarly
observed that by controlling the cash, the husband controlled
"not only the economic but the spiritual life of his wife."2 79 The
same forms of paternalistic controls are at work today; only the
targeted population has shifted. We now trust middle-class
women t9 spend money, but not poor women and their children,
who are among the main beneficiaries of many public assis-
tance programs.
IV. RESPONSES TO COMMON OBJECTIONS
There are five main objections to cash-based public assis-
tance, each of which will be addressed in turn. The first, and
by far most common, is that people will waste the money. The
American citizens").
274. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,487 (1970).
275. See Debate Stirs As States 'Cash Out'Food Stamps, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 8,
1994, § 1 at 3 [hereinafter Debate Stirs].
276. See ZELIZER, supra note 37, at 38, 48-51.
277. See id. at 45-47.
278. Id. at 55 (quoting Alice Ames Winter, The Family Purse, LADIES'
HOME J., May 1925, at 35, 185).
279. Id. at 50 (quoting Charles Zueblin, The Effect on Woman of Economic
Dependence, 14 AM. J. Soc. 606, 609 (1909)).
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second objection is that the paternalism of restricted transfers
may be warranted when the aid is meant to benefit children be-
cause one cannot guarantee that parents will spend cash on
their children. The third objection is that cash assistance is to
be avoided precisely because it is more useful, and therefore
weakens the recipient's motivation to find a job and get off pub-
lic assistance altogether. The fourth objection is that by allow-
ing public assistance to be spent on goods beyond the "basic ne-
cessities," we fuel a consumerist culture that is already too
rampant in modern-day America. Finally, opponents argue
that even if cash assistance is smart policy, it is politically un-
workable. This last objection will be addressed in the conclu-
sion.
Objection 1: People will not spend the money wisely. The
most common objection to cash transfers is the concern that
many lower-income people will spend their money in foolish or
harmful ways.280 Graetz and Mashaw call this "consumption
hazard,"28' and consider it such an overwhelming concern that
while they admit the problem may be exaggerated, it is part of
their rationale for proposing restricted transfers to lower-
income families instead of cash.28 2 It is undoubtedly true that
some people will spend their money in ways that even they will
regret. But this consumption hazard is not as great as one
might think. Lower-income people tend to be more careful than
others with their money, not less. Basic economics suggests
why: Money has a declining marginal utility; the value of an
extra dollar to Bill Gates is much less than the value of an ex-
tra dollar to the janitor who cleans his office at night. If people
at the lower end of the economic scale value each additional
dollar more, they also have more to lose if they waste it. As
economist Jan Newton has observed,
For a more affluent consumer, discovering that one has been "had" in
the marketplace may be a source of irritation, embarrassment, or
amusement. For poor families, getting less than the best deal can af-
fect the amount of food to be had for the week or the adequacy of win-
280. See, e.g., Robert Greenstein, Universal and Targeted Approaches to
Relieving Poverty: An Alternative View, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 437, 452
(Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991) ("Programs for the non-
elderly poor seem to be weaker politically when benefits are provided in cash.
The public may fear its tax dollars will go for alcohol, drugs, new cars, or ex-
travagances rather than for food or medical treatment or other purposes
deemed worthy of support.").
281. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 126, at 49.
282. Id. at 238-39.
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ter shoes and coats for school children.283
Empirical evidence exists to support this theoretical pre-
diction. A recent study of grocery shopping behavior found that
people who lived in larger, more expensive homes paid less at-
tention to prices than those with fewer economic resources. 284
Another study of food spending found that lower-income house-
holds used their limited resources wisely, eating out much less
than other families and saving money "by preparing foods from
scratch and avoiding convenience foods."285 More generally,
studies of spending patterns of lower-income families suggest
that, as one would expect, they spend larger shares than other
families of their income on basic needs, and relatively little on
"nonnecessary" items.286 Edin and Lein, in their study of low-
income women, found that "more than a third of families spent
nothing whatsoever on entertainment during the previous year;
two-thirds never ate out; nearly half spent nothing on ciga-
rettes or alcohol during the year; and four-fifths went without
cable television."287 Moreover, in the few cases where consump-
tion hazard is a real problem, avoiding cash-based assistance
will not necessarily solve it. Even within a restricted transfer
and in-kind system, people will find ways to use public assis-
tance to get the things they really want, for example, by con-
verting food stamps to cash on the black market.288
Consumption hazard is also a dangerous measure to use
because it is blatantly paternalistic. Since, as noted above,
lower-income people are no more likely than wealthier people
to make unwise purchases, restricted forms of public assistance
unfairly hold lower-income people to a higher behavioral stan-
dard.289 It is functionally no different than a system that im-
poses very high taxes on wealthier people, then returns the
money to the very same wealthy people through a package of
vouchers that force them to spend the money properly. Most
people would regard this as unthinkable, yet there is no ques-
tion that wealthy people waste money. As one lower-income
283. Jan M. Newton, Economic Rationality of the Poor, 36 HUM. ORG. 50,
58 (1977).
284. Stephen J. Hoch & Byung-Do Kim, Determinants of Store-Level Price
Elasticity, 32 J. MARKETING RES. 17, 28 (1995).
285. ALWITT & DONLEY, supra note 173, at 76.
286. See Lucilla Tan, Spending Patterns of Public-Assisted Families,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., May 2000, at 33-34.
287. EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 280 n.7.
288. See supra ntoes 232-35 and accompanying text.
289. See supra Part III.
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woman put it, "if you want to see how people spend their money
on things they don't need, and don't know much about what
they are getting, and buy it even so without thinking ahead,
you'd better go study rich folks. If I wasted money like that, I'd
be dead .... 9 0 The key question in evaluating the merits of
cash transfers should therefore not be the simplistic one of
whether there is some consumption hazard. Clearly some lim-
ited number of lower-income people will waste their money.
Instead, the central question should be, would the overall bene-
fits (the cost-effectiveness and dignity gains to many people)
outweigh the costs (some increased waste by a limited number
of people) resulting from the move to a cash-based system?
This utilitarian-style approach is, after all, fairly moderate,
considering that rights-based advocates have argued for cash
transfers independent of the amount of waste because they be-
lieve recipients have an absolute right to the transfer.291
As with many cost-benefit analyses of public policy issues,
there is no easy way to assign quantitative values to each part
of the equation. Parts II and III of this Essay sought to demon-
strate that the benefits of a cash-based system are substantial.
The question to explore here, then, is how much waste will
there be? There is no easy way to quantify it. The best we can
do is look at some specific purchases that many people would
consider wasteful, see how often lower-income people make
them, and determine whether there is ever any utility gener-
ated by doing so. The specific purchases that will be examined
here are drugs, alcohol, tobacco, lottery tickets, unhealthy food,
and cable television.
Leading off most people's list of wasteful purchases would
surely be drugs, alcohol, and tobacco. Ronald Reagan helped
popularize these concerns about lower-income people in the
1980s, with his apocryphal tale of a man who used the change
from his food stamps to buy vodka,292 but the concerns have
been around for a long time.293 The stereotypes do not hold up
290. Newton, supra note 283, at 50.
29L See ACKERTAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 14, at 9 ("Each individual citi-
zen has a right to a fair share of the patrimony left by preceding generations.
This right should not be contingent on how others use or misuse their
stakes.").
292. MARK GREEN & GAIL MACCOLL, REAGAN'S REIGN OF ERROR: THE
INSTANT NOSTALGIA EDITION 90 (2d ed. 1987).
293. See, e.g., MOYNIHAN, supra note 144, at 117 ("From the outset, [food
stamps] involved a curious assemblage of motives and attitudes.... The de-
sire to add dignity to the lives of the poor was... much in evidence, but so also
2002]
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very well, however, when tested against the facts. Research
suggests that lower-income people spend no greater share of
their income on alcohol and tobacco than the general popula-
tion, and less in total dollar terms.294 The data on drug use is
more mixed, but hardly supports the claim of rampant use of
hard drugs by lower-income people. Although people with fam-
fly incomes under $9000 per year are more likely than wealth-
ier people to use drugs, this seems mainly attributable to a
higher rate of marijuana use,2 95 not harder drugs like cocaine.
Only 2.6% of people with family incomes below $9000 have
used cocaine in the last year,296 compared to 1.9% of wealthier
people.297 Also, people in the $9000-$19,999 income bracket,
which includes many families below the poverty level,2 98 are no
more likely to use drugs than wealthier people.299 Further, re-
search has shown that demand for drugs among non-addicts
was the concern that they might spend resources unwisely. Hence food
stamps; no beer stamps."); ZELIZER, supra note 37, at 131 ("A writer in The
Charities Review pointedly cited an anecdote about a gift of 100,000 francs-in
marked coins-given to the Paris poor by the Russian czar in a recent visit. A
week later, most coins were allegedly found in taverns and wine shops.").
294. See ALWITr & DONLEY, supra note 173, at 73 tbl.5.1 (finding that low-
income households, defined as those with annual income under $10,000, spend
about 2% of their income on alcohol and tobacco, the same percentage as all
households, but only $309 per year, compared to $592 for all households). Al-
witt and Donley elsewhere suggest that low-income people buy more ciga-
rettes, but attribute this in part to aggressive marketing in low-income
neighborhoods by tobacco companies. See id. at 88.
295. See SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE
tbl.13.1 (1997) [hereinafter SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE]. According to this sur-
vey, 16.6% of people with family incomes under $9000 used drugs in the last
year, compared to 10.9% of wealthier households, with 14.9% of those under
$9000 reporting marijuana use, compared to 8.7% of other households. See id.
Figures for "other households" are weighted averages of usage rates for people
in income brackets over $9000, calculated by the Author.
296. Id. at tbl.13.1.
297. See id. (calculation by the Author, based on weighted average of usage
rates for people in income brackets over $9000).
298. See 2001 HHS Poverty Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 10,695-10,697 (2001).
299. According to the author's calculation, using the weighted average of
usage rates for people in income brackets over $19,999, 10.9% of people with
incomes over $19,999 used drugs in the last year, compared to 11.2% of people
with incomes of $9000-$19,999, a difference of only 0.3 percentage points. See
SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE, supra note 295; cf Margaret E. Ensminger et al.,
The Inner City and Drug Use: Initial Findings from an Epidemiologieal Study,
48 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 175, 180-81 (1997) (finding that people
raised in a poor urban neighborhood were no more likely to start using drugs
than a national sample).
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does not tend to rise as people's incomes increase.3°°
So will cashing out public assistance suddenly drive up the
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or cigarettes? Surely not. If
lower-income people are currently consuming at roughly the
same rate as the rest of the population, then the availability of
cash cannot be what is motivating consumption. Cash trans-
fers are unlikely, therefore, to be substantially wasted on the
purchase of additional drugs, alcohol, or tobacco products.
In addition, there may be some limited amount of utility
generated by the occasional use of some of these substances.
There is no question, of course, that alcohol, drugs, and tobacco
are often harmful to those who consume them, particularly in
large quantities. But used in moderation, they may generate
some utility. This utility can come in the form of social interac-
tion; for example, going out drinking or sharing a cigarette with
friends. Social drinking can also help alleviate stress, particu-
larly for parents of small children. As one low-income mother
explained,
Oh, sometimes, you know, just to relax or somethin', I just go out and
have a few. And when I'm really low, I sometimes go out and tie one
on, if you know what I mean. Sometimes I think I'll go crazy all day
in the house if I can't get out once in a while. I just couldn't take
it. 301
Adults may be more able to cope with their responsibilities
in life, particularly their responsibilities toward their children,
if they are less stressed, and there is no question that living life
at a low income level can be enormously stressful.30 2 This
stress-reduction argument may apply only to alcohol, however,
and of course only to moderate usage. Although some lower-
income parents also use cigarettes to help them relax,303 scien-
tific research suggests that, contrary to popular belief, smoking
actually raises stress levels.3°4 Nor can one make a sensible
argument for the social or relaxation value of drugs like heroin
300. See Nancy M. Petry, Effects of Increasing Income on Polydrug Use: A
Comparison of Heroin, Cocaine and Alcohol Abusers, 95 ADDICTION 705, 714
(2000).
301. EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 31.
302. See MAYER, supra note 116, at 48 (describing the "parental-stress"
theory of public assistance, which suggests that "transferring income to poor
families should alleviate stress, improve parenting, and thus improve chil-
dren's outcomes").
303. See supra text accompanying note 183.
304. See NAT'L CLEARINGHOUSE FOR ALCOHOL & DRUG INFO., U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., STRAIGHT FACTS ABOUT DRUGS AND ALCOHOL, at
http//www.health.org/govpubs/rpo884 (last visited March 29, 2002).
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and cocaine, since they are highly hazardous to the health and
foster debilitating addictions. In any case, one need not en-
dorse the controversial view that moderate amounts of alcohol
or any other substance can generate utility in order to support
cash-based public assistance. If the policy goal is to curb sub-
stance abuse, more effective prevention strategies and law en-
forcement are solutions much better targeted at the problem
than restricted transfers or in-kind aid would be.
Lottery tickets are another item on which many people be-
lieve lower-income people waste their money. As with alcohol,
tobacco, and drugs, public perception is not very accurate. As it
turns out, lower-income people are less likely than others to
buy lottery tickets.30 5 The reason the lottery is nonetheless
considered a regressive form of revenue raising is partly that
while lower-income people spend less per person on lottery
tickets than middle-income people, lottery spending may con-
sume a greater share of their income. 306 In addition, high-
income people are less likely than middle-income people to buy
tickets, 30 7 and therefore end up paying little into this system of
revenue raising. Of course, many people consider any money
spent on lottery tickets to be wasted. For some, this is because
they believe gambling is immoral. But if that is the problem,
the solution should be to ban the lottery altogether or engage in
public campaigns to discourage participation, not to keep cash
out of certain people's hands. Others argue that since the ex-
pected payoff is always less than the face value, lottery tickets
are a foolish investment. The flaw in this argument is that it
ignores a key benefit of lottery tickets, which is that for many
people, the tickets are a way of buying hope. Admittedly, this
is a very controversial claim, but it does describe the role that
lottery tickets play in the lives of many lower-income people.
As a homeless man who lives in Manhattan explains, "I spend
$9 to $10 every day on the lottery.... Like everyone else, I
want to get a better life. I got a feeling one of these days I
might hit."308 For many people who rely on low wages or public
305. See MEDIAMARK RES. INC., MEDIAMARK REs. SPORTS & RECREATION
REPORT: SPRING 1996, at 216; see also ALWrITr & DONLEY, supra note 173, at
89 (noting that poor people are less likely to gamble in general, whether at a
casino or by playing the lottery).
306. See Philip L. Hersch & Gerald S. McDougall, Do People Put Their
Money Where Their Votes Are? The Case of Lottery Tickets, 56 S. ECON. J. 32,
35 n.11 (1989).
307. See id. at 35-36.
308. James Fallows, The Invisible Poor, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 19, 2000,
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assistance to get by, winning the lottery may be the only way to
bring about a substantial change in their economic circum-
stances, particularly given how limited income mobility is in
the United States today.309 The people who benefit least from
this aspect of the lottery are very wealthy people, so it should
not be surprising that they buy fewer lottery tickets than mid-
dle-income people. Also, lower-income people, when they do
buy lottery tickets, tend to prefer immediate payoff, small-prize
games. 310 This makes sense; the smaller prizes will be more
valuable to them because they have less to start with,311 and
they are more likely to need money right away.
Lottery tickets therefore can generate some utility for the
lower-income consumer. They also are predominantly a mid-
dle-income purchase, not something that poor (or rich) people
spend much money on, by comparison. As a result, the risk
that cash transfers to lower-income people will generate signifi-
cant waste due to the purchase of lottery tickets seems low.
A third category of potentially wasteful purchases is un-
healthy food, including fast food and junk food. Current food
programs restrict the consumption of these foods to a certain
extent. In-kind programs, such as school lunches and soup
kitchen meals, are clearly the most constraining, since they of-
fer recipients virtually no choice about what they eat. Voucher
programs also impose some limits on the type of food consumed.
Food stamps cannot be used at restaurants or to buy prepared
hot foods at the grocery store (although they can be used for
junk food and other high-fat foods), 312 and WIC limits food pur-
chases to a very specific list of groceries, sometimes even speci-
fying which brands to buy.313 Some might fear that if these
programs were cashed out, public assistance recipients' diets
would deteriorate. Indeed, a recent survey found that non-poor
people believe poor people spend relatively more than other
families in two of four "unhealthy" food categories included in
at 68, 76; cf EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 30 (listing lottery tickets among
the purchases that low-income women make to keep themselves from feeling
"'completely on the bottom,' or that their lives were 'completely hopeless.').
309. See Michael M. Weinstein, America's Rags-to-Riches Myth, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2000, at A28.
310. See Donald I. Price & E. Shawn Novak, The Income Redistribution Ef-
fects of Texas State Lottery Games, 28 PUB. FIN. REV. 82, 89 (2000).
311. See supra text preceding note 283 on the declining marginal utility of
money.
312. See 7 U.S.C. § 2012(g)(1) (2000).
313. See ALWITr & DONLEY, supra note 173, at 79.
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the survey: snacks and frankfurters. 314 As it turns out, how-
ever, lower-income people are less likely than wealthier people
to consume fast food or junk food.315 Moreover, as with some
other potentially wasteful items, when low-income people do
buy fast food or junk food, they generate some utility in the
process. The utility comes from the pleasure of being able to
treat oneself, or one's child, to something special every once in a
while. Edin and Lein found in their study of low-income moth-
ers that "Good mothers, [respondents] believed, should treat
their children on occasion. Consequently, some mothers would
occasionally forgo necessities to pay for... a trip to a fast food
restaurant. . "...316 Again, it is difficult to see the potential for
rampant waste here; lower-income people are not buying many
of these "wasteful" foods, and when they do buy them, the pur-
chase may serve a useful purpose.
The last example of potentially wasteful purchases is cable
television. Politicians have cited cable TV as an example of a
frivolous expense; in 1995, congressional leaders seeking to cut
back on student financial aid asserted that the increased debt
burden would be no greater than a cable TV subscription, im-
plying that canceling the subscription would be no big deal.317
There are a couple of reasons why this might not be the case.
First, cable TV is often necessary in order to get any kind of
television reception in many communities. Seeing cable TV as
314. Id. at 77 tbl.5.3.
315. Id. at 74, 75 tbl.5.2 (reporting that poor households eat out much less
than other families, and spend less on cookies, crackers, candy, chips, nuts,
other snacks, and prepared foods). There is some evidence, however, that obe-
sity may be correlated with lower incomes. See David Barboza, Rampant Obe-
sity, A Debilitating Reality for the Urban Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2000, at
F5.
316. EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 7-8; see also ZUCCHINO, supra note 37,
at 176, 182-83 (describing a woman's reasons for agreeing to take her grand-
son to McDonald's even though she did not feel that she had the money);
Carey Goldberg, Working Hard, Doing Well, Less Than Excited About Bush's
Tax Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at 6 (quoting a woman with a household
income of less than $50,000 a year who criticizes the Bush tax plan for giving
too much money to families like hers and too little to the typical welfare
mother who could use the money to "take her child to McDonald's, something
we all take for granted"); Janofsky, supra note 187 (describing the food spend-
ing of a working woman raising two children and a grandchild on a low income
and food stamps, saying "[tihe biggest treat she gives the family is a rare eve-
ning at McDonald's.. ").
317. See William F. Goodling & Howard McKeon, Editorial, Making College
Loans Fair, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1995, at A27 (editorial by the then-
chairman of the House Economic Opportunities Committee and the chairman
of the subcommittee on post-secondary education).
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a waste in those situations, therefore, requires regarding tele-
vision, the primary source of entertainment and news in Amer-
ica today, as a waste. Second, for many parents, cable TV is a
means of making the home a more attractive place for children
to spend their time. As Edin and Lein learned in their study of
low-income mothers, "[A] cable television subscription is a rela-
tively inexpensive way for mothers to keep their children off
the streets and away from undesirable peers."318 Nonetheless,
Edin and Lein found that many families could not afford cable;
as noted earlier, only one out of every five women studied was
able to fit cable into her family budget.319 Once again, rampant
waste does not seem to be a real concern here.
Why is it, then, that as Alwitt and Donley put it, so many
"affluent people.., just assume the poor throw money away on
chips, candy, and liquor,"320 as well as drugs, cigarettes, lottery
tickets, and cable TV? A big part of the reason may be the con-
siderable social distance between people of different incomes.
Many wealthier people do not interact with lower-income peo-
ple on a regular basis in a way that gives them a complete pic-
ture of what their lives and their spending patterns are really
like. Instead, they get a skewed vision, from a number of
sources, as Edin and Lein explain:
Average Americans depend on newspapers, magazines, television,
and radio for their information about public policy issues. Journalists
and their editors, in turn, publicize those stories that they think will
attract the most interest or outrage. Thus, the public has been influ-
enced by stories of welfare queens who used their ill-gotten gain to
buy fancy cars and vacation homes or of mothers who exchanged
AFDC and food stamps for crack or heroin while their children hud-
dled in filthy unheated hovels.
A lot of Americans also depend on the reports of friends and rela-
tives who have more direct contact with the poor-those whom Mi-
chael Lipsky terms "street level bureaucrats": police officers, social
workers, and others whose professional lives place them in close con-
tact with those mothers who are having the most difficulty surviving
the harsh world of subsistence living. Finally, ordinary citizens often
form opinions based on their own observations in the grocery store,
where they inspect the carts of those mothers who pay with food
stamps, or when they drive by street corners of poor neighborhoods
and see working-aged adults loitering.321
318. EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 8.
319. See id. at 280 n.7.
320. ALWITr & DONLEY, supra note 173, at 4.
321. EDIN & LEIN, supra note 37, at 219-20 (citation omitted); cf
ZUCCaINO, supra note 37, at 211-12. Zucchino offers this illustration:
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In each of these situations, only a partial picture is coming
through, except possibly when people examine the grocery carts
of food stamp recipients. Even then, though, what people see
may be affected by a common cognitive dysfumction, which is
the tendency to notice things that reinforce one's preexisting
conception of the world.3 22 In other words, if you are looking for
a grocery cart with Cheetos in it, you will find it, and you will
probably remember it more than the two carts next to it filled
with rice and beans. Because of this social distance problem,
we must be particularly vigilant in policing our own and others'
preconceived notions about how lower-income people spend
their money. There will be people who spend their cash trans-
fers unwisely, but they will be much fewer and farther between
than most people would imagine. In general, the benefits of
providing cash transfers will far outweigh the minor losses that
will come from giving people the freedom to spend.
Objection 2: If the assistance is meant to benefit children,
then in-kind aid or restricted transfers are justified because they
help ensure that parents do not spend the money on them-
selves. 323 There are several reasons why this paternalistic jus-
tification is flawed. First of all, it is unlikely that a government
or private institution could be better at anticipating and re-
sponding to an individual child's needs-that is, could be more
"paternalistic"--than the parents themselves, at least in the
vast majority of cases. Admittedly, some parents lack informa-
tion about proper nutrition, for example, but that concern can
be addressed through education, rather than through in-kind or
Cheri found a piece of folded paper tucked into her notebook. She un-
folded it and began to laugh. It was a cartoon Willie Baptist had
drawn and given to her. On one side of the paper Willie had drawn a
half-naked man with wild hair, running madly down the street, rant-
ing and raving, his eyes wide with fright. On the other side of the pa-
per, he had drawn a picture of a house on fire. He had given the car-
toons to Cheri after they had discussed ways to get people to see the
whole picture of poor people and people on welfare. "You think a man
running down the street is crazy until you realize his house has
burned down," Cheri said .... "It's the same way with people on wel-
fare. You assume they're lazy cheats until you see the whole picture
of what's happened in their lives."
Id.
322. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISsONANcE 149-52
(Stanford U. Press reissue 1962) (1957).
323. See, e.g., GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 126, at 230 (explaining that
one "technique for assuring that public support actually benefits children and
is not easily diverted by parents to other purposes is to provide benefits to
families in-kind, rather than in cash").
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restricted transfers. Second, parents generally want what is
best for their children and few would neglect their children's
needs if they had more cash to spend. As a teacher in a poor
school district observed,
We should not confuse families' inability to do with their desire to
do.... One of the most astounding things to me since I've been here is
how few parents there are-in fact I could only think of one or two ifI
thought real hard-that don't seem to care. Folks care. They want
for their kids.3
24
The problems created by those few parents who do neglect their
children can be addressed by the child welfare system; re-
stricted transfers are not the only solution. Third, if some of
the money directed at the support of a child is spent in a man-
ner that improves the parent's quality of life in some way, this
can end up benefiting the child as well. Simply put, happier
parents tend to raise happier children.325 Separating a child's
needs from her parent's needs is therefore quite difficult. Fi-
nally, on a practical level, since children's lives are so inter-
twined with their parents' lives, it may be difficult, even
through in-kind aid or restricted transfers, to ensure that cer-
tain types of assistance actually benefit the child and not the
parent.
Objection 3: Because cash transfers are more useful and of-
ten less embarrassing to the recipient, they provide a lesser in-
centive for the recipient to seek a job and get off public assis-
tance.326 There are three responses to this objection. The first,
and most important, is that the main determinant of the work
324. MAYER, supra note 116, at 150-51.
325. Cf. id. at18.
326. See BLANK, supra note 257, at 106 ("[S]ome supporters of these pro-
grams believe that it is exactly this 'embarrassment' element that makes these
programs more effective than cash assistance, since it provides an incentive
for people to leave the program."). The objection is summarized by Mark
Robert Rank:
Afraid that handouts will encourage dependency, assistance pro-
grams stigmatize those who receive benefits to prevent them from
asking for more, and to make it clear to others that there is an emo-
tional price to pay"... [T]his idea dates from the English Poor Laws,
which postulated that if public relief were an attractive alternative to
employment, people would choose relief over work.
RANK, supra note 252, at 129-30 (citation omitted); VAN PARIJS, supra note 17,
at 247 n.24 ("[Wihat may be the most frequent argument for justifying in-kind
welfare benefits... [is] that they will be better at filtering out the 'undeserv-
ing', those who are not truly needy, because of the stigma attached to collect-
ing them." (citation omitted)); see also ZELIZER, supra note 37, at 132 (provid-
ing an example of this kind of thinking dating back to 1895).
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disincentive is not what form the aid takes, but rather how
much it is worth. Large amounts of aid, whether in the form of
in-kind aid, vouchers, or cash, will create a much greater work
disincentive than small amounts of aid. Cash may be more
useful, but a person's decision about whether or not to seek
work will largely be driven by whether or not she can achieve a
higher standard of living by working. Second, if the concern is
that people will use public assistance to avoid work, a much
more direct solution would be to require able-bodied people to
work in order to receive public assistance, as is increasingly be-
ing done.327 Constructing a complex system of in-kind aid and
restricted transfers, by contrast, is a very inefficient way of
combating work disincentives. The cost-effectiveness and dig-
nity losses attach to everyone who receives public assistance,
rather than just the subset of people for whom the availability
of cash would make the critical difference in the decision about
whether or not to work. Finally, the cost-effectiveness and dig-
nity losses from a non-cash system spill over from this subset of
non-working adults to their children. The child who gets
mocked for trying to use a food stamp to pay for a field trip328 is
the innocent victim of this "stigmatize-them-until-it-hurts"
strategy.
Objection 4: Valuing the act of spending cash just fuels an
already excessive consumerism in modern American society. It
is certainly true that part of the motivation for cash transfers is
to empower lower-income people as consumers and allow them
to make the same range of choices that other people can make.
And they will surely, like the rest of us, buy products they see
advertised on television even when whatever they have at
home would sometimes do just as well. But those who see the
rampant consumerism in America as a societal problem329
should recognize the need for a society-wide solution; other-
wise, those at the bottom will continue to be punished for the
desires of those at the top. Not only is singling out lower-
income consumers unfair;330 it is also a highly ineffective means
327. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
328. See supra text preceding note 1.
329. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 192; SCHOR, supra note 189; ef
ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 14, at 192 (acknowledging, but not endors-
ing, the critique that "something important has been lost in the shift to the
modern marketplace of mass production and consumer choice").
330. Cf Peter Coulombe, Untitled, in WEALTH is THE SMALLEST THING ON
EARTH...: LIviNG SPIRITUALLY IN A MATERIAL WORLD 44 (United Church of
Christ at Yale ed., 2000) (observations of a legal aid attorney, who argues that
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of reducing consumerism. Depriving lower-income people of
the ability to purchase a variety of consumer goods will not
make them any less desirous of having them. As noted earlier,
needs and desires in any society are determined in large part
by what others have. 331 For example, as long as most Ameri-
cans have VCRs, lower-income Americans will want to buy
VCRs. Making it more difficult for them to do so, by limiting
public assistance to non-cash forms, will not make them want
VCRs less; it will just isolate them further socially. Those who
wish to battle consumerism must strike instead at its source.
Wherever that may be, it is certainly not in the small-scale
purchases of the limited segment of the population that de-
pends on public assistance.
CONCLUSION
Despite the cost-effectiveness and dignity-enhancing ef-
fects of cashing out public assistance, many people dismiss the
idea as politically impossible. Part of the reason is that en-
trenched interest groups favor certain restricted transfers and
in-kind aid; any attempt to dismantle food stamps or commod-
ity-based food programs would surely meet resistance from the
agricultural lobby, for example. 2 But the primary concern is
that the public simply would not accept the idea of putting
more cash into the hands of lower-income people.
So great is this concern that many people who say they
support the idea of cash transfers in theory end up proposing
restricted transfers. Graetz and Mashaw, for instance, reject a
negative income tax partly because they feel people are more
willing to transfer funds targeted at specific "basic necessi-
ties,"333 and add that "misuse of cash subsidies by a handful of
"we [cannot] ethically strive to relinquish our personal dependence on material
things without simultaneously working toward a basic material sustenance for
all").
331. See supra notes 198-211 and accompanying text.
332. See Fraker et al., supra note 215, at 390 ("Support for the [food stamp]
program has also been generated by the ties between food and agriculture.
Indeed, these ties explain in part why the program has consistently enjoyed
the support of a number of relatively conservative Republican legislators from
rural areas ... who are not always supportive of low-income assistance pro-
grams in general."); Debate Stirs, supra note 275 (quoting then-Senate Agri-
culture Committee Chairman Patrick Leahy saying, of food stamp cash-outs,
"Many members of Congress would be concerned that the $22 billion they are
providing to buy agricultural products would instead be used to buy anything
from beer to movie tickets to floor mats.").
333. GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 126, at 49.
2002]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
low-income parents threatens the political sustainability of
subsidies for the entire population." 334 Liberal critics of the
cash-out experiments with food stamps have likewise suggested
that cash-outs will end up hurting lower-income people by un-
dermining public support for the program.335
In seeming contradiction to these claims about political op-
position to cash transfers, however, the Earned Income Tax
Credit has managed to gain a real foothold. From its inception,
the federal EITC has enjoyed the support not only of Democ-
rats, but also of Republican presidents, even if not of all Repub-
licans in Congress; 336 Gerald Ford signed it into law, Ronald
Reagan supported it, and the current President Bush has spo-
ken favorably about it.337 Republicans may not all share De-
mocrats' enthusiasm for expanding the EITC, but they are not
actively trying to get rid of it, either. And states are continuing
to enact their own EITCs.338 At a time when other cash trans-
fers seem to be politically unpopular, one might wonder why
the EITC has managed to survive, and even flourish. The cen-
tral reason must be that the EITC benefits people who work,
and is not perceived as an outright handout. If this is the criti-
cal distinction, however, the fact that there are now work re-
quirements for able-bodied food stamp recipients, 339 for exam-
ple, eliminates this as a reason to keep that program as a
restricted transfer. In fact, the transformation of welfare pro-
grams into workfare programs may already be leading to re-
newed public support for cash-based assistance. Here is what
the director of the Missouri Department of Social Services had
to say in support of his state's proposal to cash out food stamps
and AFDC and use the money to subsidize workfare jobs:
334. Id. at 239.
335. See Debate Stirs, supra note 275 ("Robert Greenstein, who ran the
food-stamp program under President Jimmy Carter and now heads the Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, worries that the more food stamps look like a
cash supplement, the more vulnerable they become.").
336. See Balanced Budget Act of 1995, H.R. 2491, 104th Cong. § 13201
(1995) (legislation passed by the Republican-controlled Congress, cutting back
on the EITC).
337. See FRANK, supra note 192, at 256-57 (noting the support of Ford and
Reagan); Tim Weiner, Criticism Appears to Doom Republican Budget Tactic,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 1, 1999, at A20 (quoting then-Governor and presidential can-
didate George W. Bush criticizing congressional Republicans for their proposal
to delay EITC payments, saying, "I don't think they ought to balance their
budget on the backs of the poor.").
338. See supra note 158.
339. See supra note 4.
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"We're not simply cashing out benefits, we're cashing out bene-
fits into a wage. One day they have food stamps, the next day
they have a paycheck. They have to make real-world decisions
on how to spend their money."340 If others start to see public
assistance in this light, the trend toward work requirements
may become a trend toward cash-based assistance as well.
Those political leaders and charity officials who nonethe-
less still favor restricted transfers and in-kind aid should at
least have the courage to consider the arguments in favor of
cash transfers. By bringing cost-effectiveness and dignity con-
cerns into the public debate, and by openly examining the reali-
ties of life at a low income, they may discover that their policies
are grounded in misconceptions about how people spend their
money. It is always difficult to change the public's mind about
something, but it does help to have the facts on your side. All it
should take to create public support for cash transfers is to
convince people that their money is being wasted if they don't
give it in cash, not if they do. This is a challenge well worth
taking on.
340. Debate Stirs, supra note 275.
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